

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The Problem of Nationality in Soviet Russia*

BY IVAN KURGANOV

NATIONALITY is a social phenomenon. Nationality evolves in the process of social interrelations and interactions, and it changes with the changing structure of society. During the last three decades, Russia's social structure has undergone a profound transformation; the social environment that molds the human being is no longer the same. An essential fact in this respect is the development of the national culture and national consciousness of all the peoples inhabiting Russia.

There are as many as 194 nationalities in Russia. Numerically the largest, according to the last population census of the USSR, are the following:¹

	In thousands	%
Russians	99,019.9	58.41
Ukrainians	28,070.4	16.56
Byelorussians	5,267.4	3.11
Georgians	2,248.6	1.33
Armenians	2,151.9	1.27
Azerbaijanians	2,274.8	1.34
Uzbeks	4,844.0	2.86
Tadjiks	1,229.0	0.72
Turkmens	811.8	0.48
Kazakhs	3,098.8	1.83
Kirghiz	884.3	0.52
Karelians and Finns	395.7	0.23
Estonians	142.5	0.08
Latvians	126.9	0.07
Lithuanians	32.3	0.02
Tartars	4,300.3	2.54
Jews	3,020.1	1.78

*This article was published in the Russian-language periodical, *Novyi Zhurnal*, New York, v. xxv, 1951.

¹See *Strany Mira* (Statistical Reference Book), Moscow, 1946, pp. 127-128.

	In thousands	%
Germans (about) ²	1,500.0	0.87
Mordvins	1,451.4	0.87
Choovash	1,367.9	0.81
Dagestan peoples	857.4	0.50
Poles	626.9	0.37
Greeks	285.9	0.17
Bashkirs	842.9	0.50
Udmurds	605.7	0.36
Mari	481.3	0.28
Komi	408.7	0.24
Ossetes	354.5	0.21
Moldavians	260.0	0.15
Kara-Kalpaks	185.8	0.11
Koreans	180.4	0.11
Kabardines	164.1	0.10
Others ³	2,975.5	1.21
USSR	170,467.2	100.00

Formerly, all these nationalities differed widely in degree of cultural development. On old Russia's vast territory half-savage, completely illiterate ethnic groups lived side by side with peoples of advanced modern culture. Today the situation is different. All the peoples of Russia, and in particular the backward ones of Asiatic origin, have sharply raised their cultural level and many of them present a radically altered social structure. A marked cultural growth of all Russia's nationalities has taken place. To be sure, the leading nationalities had shown a measure of cultural progress before. What is new, is the rapid tempo and the vast scope of the process since the Revolution.

The Party, in its struggle for expansion and world domination, needed a large army equipped according to the latest technical standards. To build tanks, guns, trucks, aircraft, warships, a modern industry is needed. But modern industry requires large numbers of literate workers and skilled engineers; so does mechanized

²According to the census of 1926, there were 1,238.5 thousand Germans in the USSR. In the reference book *Strany Mira* Germans, probably for "political reasons," are not listed separately but are included under the heading "Others." We have separated them and allotted them their approximately correct number of 1,500 thousand.

³"Others" include: Adigays, Abkhaz, Oirots, Khakas, Kurds, Iranians, Chinese, Slovaks, Arabs, Assyrians, Lapps, Ostiaks, Voguls, Samoyeds, etc.

agriculture and mechanized transportation. And most important of all, the army itself needs men able at least to read and write. The Party, therefore, driven not by love of the people but by love of power, devoted special attention to the "training of cadres," that is, to the fight against illiteracy, in order to raise the general cultural level of the population. The gain in literacy is evident from the following figures which reflect the percentage of literates in the age group from 9 to 20:⁴

Date of census	Male	Female	Total
1897	35.8	12.4	24.0
1926	66.5	37.1	51.1
1939	90.8	72.6	81.2

Thus, over the period from 1897 to 1939, literacy increased more than three times (that of women, nearly six times). This is a very important aspect of the cultural progress that took place in the USSR.

This progress involves not only the peoples forming the national majority, but also all the national minorities. This is clear from the following figures showing the percentage of literates, from the age of nine up, in the various national republics:⁵

	1926	1939
RSFSR	55.0	81.9
Ukraine	57.5	85.3
Byelorussia	53.1	78.9
Azerbaijan	25.2	73.3
Georgia	47.5	80.3
Armenia	34.5	73.8
Turkmenistan	12.5	67.2
Uzbekistan	10.6	67.8
Tadjikistan	3.7	71.7
Kazakhstan	22.8	76.3
Kirghiz SSR	15.1	70.0
Average for the USSR	51.1	81.2

Thus, by 1939 the number of literates for the whole country had reached 81.2% of the population. Since 1939, the literacy of the population, as a result of the law introducing compulsory universal education, has made further strides and is now more evenly dis-

⁴Professor Boyarsky, *Demograficheskaya Statistika*, Moscow, 1947, p. 27.

⁵*Strany Mira*, p. 167.

tributed. It may be said that today all the manifold nationalities of the USSR have attained the same, or nearly the same, level of literacy. All have today access to the printed word in their own language, even those national groups (over 40 of them) which before the Revolution did not possess even the rudiments of a literature. Russia today speaks and writes in 119 languages.

But literacy alone is not enough. For a backward ethnic group to become a nation, an entity endowed with national consciousness and a sense of social unity that is called the "soul" of a nation, it has to bring forth its own intellectual élite. It is the "intelligentsia" that gives expression to the soul of the nation and is the custodian of its collective memory. Under modern conditions it is this intellectual élite that cements the nation, cultivates and develops its national consciousness. Without a national intelligentsia there can be no nation. In this respect, too, important developments have occurred in the USSR.

Industrial construction has been carried out not so much in the old industrial areas (the Ural, the Donetz Basin, Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo), as in new, formerly underdeveloped areas, among them a number of national republics. There were many reasons for this: the greater proximity of sources of raw materials and power, the shortening of freight transportation lines, the concentration of industries in strategically invulnerable places, and so forth. But one of the chief motives for the setting-up of industries in the national republics probably was the intention of the Party to create there a class of industrial workers in order to split the nationality along class lines and ultimately to break the national spine by means of the class principle. Be this as it may, an impressive industry has been built up in many a national republic. As a result, the rise in the gross industrial output in 1940, as compared with 1913, is reflected in the following figures:

For the USSR overall increase to 10.9⁶ times the previous figure.

" Ukraine	"	"	"	11.0	"	"	"	"
" Kazakhstan	"	"	"	22.2	"	"	"	"
" Armenia	"	"	"	22.3	"	"	"	"
" Georgia	"	"	"	26.4	"	"	"	"
" Uzbekistan	"	"	"	28.0	"	"	"	"

⁶It should be noted that this figure for the increase in the industrial output is not always corroborated. While, for instance, *Pravda Vostoka* of December 26, 1950, quotes the figure 10.9, the newspaper *Kommunist* of November 21, 1950, mentions 8.5, and the *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* of January 16, 1951, mentions 12. We quote here, however, the figure 10.9 of the original source.

" Kirghizia	"	"	" 160.0	"	"	"	"
" Tadzhikistan	"	"	" 242.0	"	"	"	"

The growing industry in the national republics is dependent on cadres of workers drawn in part from the central areas of Russia and in part from the local population. The large number of "nationals" among the labor force created the need for "national" engineers, technicians, bookkeepers, planners, etc.; that is, the need for a national intelligentsia. Such a need was felt not only within the new industries but also in every other field of the national economy. Everywhere industrial growth was accompanied by the rise and expansion of towns, the development of urban commerce and transportation, the construction of schools, hospitals, theaters, and other urban establishments. And all this required vast numbers of teachers, doctors, artists, journalists, propagandists, and functionaries of every description. Part of this intelligentsia was, and still is, supplied by the provinces of the interior; but another part—today a considerable one—is recruited from the local nationalities. In order to train this local intelligentsia, a network of educational institutions on the university level has been set up in all the national republics as shown by the following figures:⁷

Republic	Institutions of Higher Learning			Number of Students	
	1914-15	1939	1951	1914-15	1939
RSFSR	71	470	—	85,000	399,986
Ukrainian SSR	19	148	158	26,700	126,654
Byelorussian SSR	—	22	26	—	15,425
Azerbaijani SSR	—	14	17	—	12,520
Georgian SSR	1	21	—	300	22,731
Armenian SSR	—	9	14	—	7,426
Turkmen SSR	—	6	7	—	2,580
Uzbek SSR	—	29	34	—	19,946
Tadjik SSR	—	7	8	—	2,179
Kazakh SSR	—	19	26	—	8,432
Kirghiz SSR	—	5	7	—	2,008
	91	750	—	112,000	619,897

⁷Figures for 1914-15 in *Sotzialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo Soyuzov SSR, 1933-1938*, Moscow, 1939, p. 152. Figures for 1939 in *Strany Mira*, Moscow, 1946, p. 173. Figures for 1951 in *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 25, 1950, and *Pravda Vostoka*, November 25, 1950.

In addition to institutions of higher learning, research institutes were created in the national republics, in ten of them even academies of sciences. It goes without saying that the availability of secondary schools and of institutions on a higher level, has played a decisive part in the emergence of an indigenous intelligentsia in all these republics. Today, a Kirghiz, let us say (or for that matter a Bashkir, an Uzbek, a Tartar) in the rôle of professor, engineer, physician, lawyer, etc., is no longer anything unusual.

According to the census of 1939, the national republics by that time already had the following numbers of persons with secondary and higher education for every thousand of the population:⁸

	With secondary education	With higher education
RSFSR (Russians and other nationals)	76.8	6.5
Byelorussian SSR	78.1	7.2
Azerbaijani SSR	73.2	6.7
Armenian SSR	81.5	5.8
Ukrainian SSR	94.6	7.2
Georgian SSR	113.4	11.2
Turkmen SSR	46.2	3.2
Uzbek SSR	38.6	3.1
Tadjik SSR	27.1	2.0
Kazakh SSR	59.9	4.5
Kirghiz SSR	32.5	2.2
USSR	77.7	6.4

Thus, by the beginning of 1939, only the central-Asiatic republics were somewhat lagging behind.⁹ But since 1939 there has been a further advance, and the proportion of educated people in the various national republics varies less widely.

The emergence of a national intelligentsia is a fact of prime

⁸*Strany Mira*, p. 174. One should keep in mind that the national republics include many newcomers from the interior whose percentage of educated people is higher than that of the local population. This, however, is to some extent offset by the fact that a number of educated persons from other republics live in the RSFSR.

⁹One should, however, take into account the fact that before the Revolution Uzbekistan, for instance, had only 1.6% of people able to read and write and only one person with a university education—the son of the interpreter of the Samarkand Governor.

importance. This new intelligentsia, to be sure, is of a peculiar Communist brand. Its way of life and outlook are controlled by the Party; and it promotes a culture national only in form, but Communist in content. Nevertheless, it has arisen; and once born, it grows and develops. It does much that is useful: it restores the history of its people, collects and systematizes its folklore, creates a theater, music, architecture. . . . It cannot be denied that it is creative. What if their historical generalizations are falsifications? Despite this, historical facts are brought to light and rescued from oblivion. What if the theaters glorify the Party and Stalin, "the Father of the Peoples"? While doing this, they are groping for a national form of expression. What if the publishing houses print the ineptitudes of thousands of local ballad-mongers? They also publish the works of the great national poets of the past. What if the building organizations erect monstrosities in what they call the style of "socialist-national realism"? Once in a while they build such fine things as the pavilions of the agricultural exhibition, whose architecture in some ways truly reflects the spirit of the nation. Side by side with a sham national style, the intelligentsia, consciously or unconsciously, creates the elements of a genuine national culture. It keeps alive the historical memory of its people, polishes its language, awakens its national consciousness. The pseudo-national forms will disappear, the culture will live—it is already alive, and it is a national culture.

Hand in hand with national culture develops national consciousness. It is already apparent that nearly all¹⁰ the national groups of Russia have been transformed from "nations in themselves" into "nations for themselves," in other words, from ethnic groups into nations with a more or less highly developed national consciousness. Russia has become a multinational state not only in fact but also as reflected in the consciousness of its peoples.

It is true that the national consciousness of Russia's peoples has its peculiar features. The national consciousness of many peoples of Western Europe evolved under conditions of inequality and mutual enmity between nations and grew strong in the struggle for national interests. The peoples of the USSR are becoming conscious of themselves as nations under conditions of complete equality (all are slaves

¹⁰To some extent, the peoples of the far North are an exception. The words "nearly all" apply to some 100 nationalities, of which over twenty are more numerous than the *Estonians*. This means that the national problem in Russia cannot be reduced to the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian, and Armenian problems.

and equal in their slavery!) and genuine harmony, as natural and inevitable as the comradeship among the inmates of the same prison ward. All the nations of the USSR are equally deprived of any rights, they possess nothing, there is nothing for them to quarrel about. Their national consciousness, therefore, is not social-political but historical and cultural in character.

The national culture of the peoples of the USSR, the basis of their national consciousness, also presents some peculiar characteristics. The national culture of every people of the USSR is being molded under the strong and vigilant influence of the Party in power. It is shorn of everything that fails to conform to the Party's official outlook and it gradually acquires a new meaning, combining the ideologies of nation, class, and Party; it is national in form and Communist in content. National forms are being utilized by the Party as the easiest way of approaching any given people and the most effective vehicle for indoctrination with Communist ideas.

The emergence of a national intelligentsia and the growth of a national culture were closely linked with objective social and economic processes in the USSR, and the Party could not have prevented them, but it could make them serve its own ends. This it did and in this it was successful. Every single national culture (just as the Orthodox Church) is being enslaved by Communism and exploited by the Party with the sole purpose of bringing forth a new kind of man, a new Soviet nation.

Another factor of momentous importance, which has wrought a profound change in the social environment that shapes the human being, is the gradual, systematic "fusion" of nationalities, the reshuffling of the whole population, now going on in the USSR on a grandiose scale. Migrations, shifts of population, are nothing unusual and are taking place in many countries. In search of work, of land, or of better living conditions, people move from rural to urban areas, from region to region, from country to country,¹¹ but what is happening in Russia is in many respects an entirely new and specific phenomenon.

For one thing, the population shifts in Russia are the result not only of economic but also of political motives; and these political

¹¹Outside the USSR, the migration from low-wage to high-wage countries plays an important part. In the past, Russia had a share in this movement. Today no one is allowed to emigrate from the USSR (not even the Russian wives of foreigners). We shall therefore apply the term "migration" to internal population shifts.

motives are responsible for the displacement not only of individual families and groups of people but of whole social classes, of entire republics.

In the second place, the migration in most cases is not initiated by the migrants themselves but is forced upon them by the authorities. It is not voluntary, but compulsory.

Thirdly, the movement is not chaotic, not spontaneous, from case to case, but is systematically directed and organized from above on a "scientific basis." Every new Five-Year Plan involves a redistribution of the productive forces and a corresponding redistribution of the available manpower. In accordance with the plan, operational directives are issued for the transfer of populations. The purpose of this is both economic and social-political; one particular aim is the thorough reshuffling of Russia's nationalities. As a result, the whole nationality picture in the USSR is undergoing a transformation.

In this transformation, the compulsory transfer of whole peoples for political reasons plays a major part. Ever since the Communists came to power, deportations to remote areas have been part of their policy. In the twenties, such deportations were still on a modest scale and not yet part of a conscious plan to reshuffle the population—their purpose was to purge the state of so-called *class enemies* in order to consolidate the Soviet régime. From the very first, however, concentration camps had been set up and ways and means had been discovered for an effective exploitation of the prisoners' labor. Thus the foundation was laid for a system of slave labor. In the late twenties and especially in the thirties, the network of concentration camps in remote areas was vastly expanded and political exile of class enemies and later of *enemies of the people*¹² received an extraordinary impetus. The whole country was in the grip of red terror. Millions of people were subjected to all kinds of repressive measures—arrests, executions, imprisonment in concentration camps; and the kin of these millions were deported to remote areas. In this way, the red terror made a notable contribution to the reshuffling of the population. In the forties, this political reshuffling was carried out as part of a systematic plan. The net of concentration camps sprawled all over the country. A large number of industrial plants switched over to the exclusive use of prisoners' labor.

¹²The term "enemy of the people" replaced that of "class enemy" when classes were declared non-existent in the USSR.

Enclosed with barbed wire, these plants became a kind of prison workshop. The cadres of concentration camp inmates were drawn from new sources: people who had remained in German-occupied territories, returning prisoners of war and repatriated DP's, nationalities which in wartime had proved unreliable; and lastly, the so-called "deviationists," "cosmopolitans," and other unfortunate Soviet citizens ill-attuned to the era of preparation for World War III. Entire republics not so long before hailed as "equal" members of the Soviet federation (such as, for instance, the republics of the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tatars, the Chechen and Ingush) were now being liquidated. Their populations were shipped wholesale to remote parts of the country. Simultaneously, there were mass deportations of the indigenous populations of border regions and newly occupied territories—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Western Byelorussia, Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and, to some extent, the satellite countries.

This eastward stream of "nationals" was countered by a movement in the opposite direction—that of migrants from Russia's interior to the borderlands and the newly occupied territories. Few Balts are left today in the Baltic countries, few Germans in East Prussia, few Karelians on the Karelian isthmus. On the other hand, many new nationalities have made their appearance in the Russian North, in Siberia, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, etc.

For thirty years now this internal migration has been going on. Millions of prisoners and deportees move in an unceasing stream from South to North, from West to East, Southeast and Northeast, and lately from East to West. "Voluntary" migrants as well as prisoners released from concentration camps (after having survived their term of penal servitude) settle in areas far away from their homes and naturally alter the national composition of the local population. In this way, a continuous merging of nationalities and a transformation of the nationality pattern within the USSR are taking place. However, the effect of political migration should not be exaggerated—it plays a considerable but by no means an essential rôle in the reshuffling of Russia's population. The decisive factor is the reorganization of the entire political and economic structure of the state.

A most important aspect of this reorganization is the conversion of a primarily agrarian and only secondarily industrial country into an industrial-agrarian one. This conversion has brought about a radical change in the correlation between the rural and urban popula-

tion and has altered the character both of the towns and of the countryside.

A comparison of the census of 1939 with that of 1926 reveals the changed relation between the rural and urban population:

Census of	Urban		Rural		Total	
	In millions	%	In millions	%	In millions	%
1926	26.3	17.9	120.7	82.1	147.0	100
1939	55.9	32.8	114.6	67.2	170.5	100

Thus, in twelve years the urban population increased by 29,600,000 people. This increase was due to:

The movement of people from villages to towns	18.5 million	62.5%
The conversion of villages into towns	5.8 "	19.6%
The natural growth of the urban population	5.3 "	17.9%

In the course of twelve years 24.3 million villagers became town dwellers. This means that annually some two million people were transformed from peasant-farmers into industrial and clerical workers.

The population shift from village to town is being accomplished in two ways: through the organized recruitment of labor in the form of contracts between industrial plants and collective farms on the one hand, and through the creation of labor reserves, that is, the compulsory mobilization of children and their allocation to various industries on the other. Both the adult *kolkhoz* members recruited under contracts, and the children conscripted to form a labor reserve are being moved from their villages, not only to towns within the borders of their own republics but also to other republics; for instance, from Byelorussian villages to towns in the Ukraine, from Ukrainian villages to towns in Siberia, from Siberian villages to towns in Turkestan, and so on. This policy is dictated both by economic necessity and by the political purpose of reshuffling the population and mixing the nationalities. But even apart from any preconceived plan, the uprooting and migration of over 24 million people from rural to urban areas involve the breaking up of their traditional national mode of life. History teaches that the peasantry, and not the urban working class, has always been the guardian of national traditions and has provided the mass basis for every national movement. A Kirghiz torn away from his native steppe and put to work on the assembly line of a ball-bearing factory in

Moscow inevitably loses his national characteristics. Working in a city factory, housed in city lodgings, he adopts the urban way of life and gradually sheds his individuality as a Kirghiz, at first in his outward appearance and finally in his inner self. Over 24 million peasant-farmers (Russians, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Ukrainians and others) have been converted into industrial and office workers; today already a third of the population of the USSR live in towns, and the change in the numerical relation between rural and urban population has been accompanied by a corresponding change in the national mode of life of Russia's peoples.

The character of the towns themselves has changed. In old Russia, the "provincial" and "district" towns had been administrative and commercial centers; the "*oblast*" and "regional" towns of today are primarily industrial and cultural centers. No longer officials and merchants but industrial workers and professional people are the leading element of the town population. The heroes of Saltykov-Shchedrin, Ostrovsky, Chekhov, and even Gorky, belong to the past.

Old Russia had 790 towns and 54 urban-type settlements.¹³ The USSR by January 1, 1947 had 1380 towns and 1982 urban-type settlements.¹⁴ Thus, within the last three decades 590 new towns have sprung up, not counting the new settlements. As a rule, the new towns have been built in sparsely populated, sometimes in quite uninhabited areas, such as the Siberian taiga, the Turkestan desert, the northern tundra, the Kazakh steppe, the Pamir foothills, etc. Clearly, the population of these new towns has been drawn not from any local inhabitants but from people of other areas; as a result, they usually are multinational. But even the old small towns that have grown into cities with tens and hundreds of thousands of inhabitants have become practically new and also multinational urban centers. Nor have the widely known big cities of old Russia escaped change. Each of them has regained and sharply increased its population and has to some extent lost its former monolithic national character. The following figures reflect the changes in their population in thousands:¹⁵

¹³*Statisticheski Yezhegodnik*, 1912.

¹⁴According to data given by Molotov in a report of November 6, 1947. Later material, published in 1950 and 1951, quotes higher figures for towns and settlements in the USSR.

¹⁵See *SSSR v Tsifrakh*, Moscow, 1934, p. 93.

	1917	1920	1933
Moscow	1,701.3	1,028.2	3,633.3
Leningrad	2,500.0	722.2	2,776.4
Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg)		90.0	462.6
Cheliabinsk		57.5	214.0
Novosibirsk (Novonikolayevsk)		68.0	287.0
Stalino (Yuzovka)		38.0	273.9
Stalingrad		90.4	404.0
Dniepropetrovsk (Ekaterinoslav)		163.0	379.2
Kharkov		230.4	654.3

Thus, a population increase of three to five times is a usual phenomenon, even in the largest cities. Not only has the urban population grown, in many cases it is a new population. Leningrad, for instance, has lost and then regained its population twice: the first time, during the Revolution and the famine years of 1917-19, when the city was nearly deserted and grass was growing in its main avenues; the second time, during the war years 1941-45, when the city once again lost most of its inhabitants, part of the working population having been evacuated and the factories moved, part being sent to the frontline which passed close by the city, and some 1,200,000 dying of starvation. Today the old buildings still stand, but most of the people are newcomers of many nationalities.

And the countryside in the USSR is changing too. The peasantry, provider for the nation and guardian of its traditions, is no longer the same. The rural population is shrinking. As we have seen, in the interval between the census of 1926 and that of 1939, the village lost 24.3 million people to the town. The natural growth during that period added 18.5 million people; that means that the countryside gave up to the town all its natural increase and in addition 6.1 million of its basic stock. But the rural population not only decreased, it also underwent a deep transformation. This transformation and, in particular, the change in the national composition, was a slow process; but it has gone on steadily and in the last few years has been accelerated. Every year hundreds of thousands of new workers have been moved into the rural areas (political instructors, tractor mechanics, drivers, agronomists, teachers, livestock breeders, veterinarians, doctors, officials, and many others) and have settled in the countryside either permanently or for long terms and changed the pattern of its population. The once illiterate village

has not only become literate, almost without exception, but has already brought forth a considerable intelligentsia of its own. The remotest backwoods village today has a sprinkling of intelligentsia. Many years ago, Saltykov-Shchedrin wrote about his native village Spas-Ugol: "The place where I was born and spent my childhood, even in those obscure out-of-the-way parts, was considered a God-forsaken hole. By its very nature it seemed predestined for serfdom. . . . Hidden out of sight in a corner, in the midst of woods and swamps, its inhabitants were commonly nicknamed 'behind-the-corner people' . . ."

Before the Revolution the village Spas-Ugol had no school and hardly anyone of the "behind-the-corner people" could read and write. Today all the villagers to a man are literate and some have a university education. The village has 10 teachers, one agronomist, one doctor, one librarian, several party officials, tractor mechanics, etc. And this is by no means unusual.

The countryside is changing. Its whole economic structure as well as all the methods of farming is changing. Ploughing, threshing, the care of livestock—everything about farming is different from what it was before; and that means that the whole way of life is different, since so much of life is spent in work. This profound change is not only a matter of mechanization, or of collectivization, or of this or that new method of cultivation. It is first of all a matter of a new organization of agricultural labor: the transition from individual family farming to socialized work on the factory model. The father no longer directs the work—it is the chairman of the collective farm; no longer does the husband give orders in the field but it is the brigade leader; no longer does one work "from sunrise to sunset" but by the clock; no longer is the father the provider but every member of the family is his own provider; no longer is the farmer an all-round worker but a specialist in various agricultural skills—a stableman, a swineherd, a milker, a tractor-driver, a watchman, etc. The similarity between agricultural and industrial production is growing, and in the process rural life is gradually losing its national coloring. A tractor-driver in Armenia is not very different from one in Byelorussia, and a collective farm in the Ukraine is very much like one in Great Russia.

And it is not only the rural economy that is changing. All the old folkways of the rural community are dying out. No longer do young village girls lead round dances, no longer do they throw flower garlands on the waters, no longer do they tell fortunes on winter nights.

On Christmas night the children no longer go from house to house singing carols in their high clear voices. The old folk no longer carry pussy willow branches from Church on Palm Sunday. The villagers no longer "raise" the ikons on hot summer days to hold services in the fields above the swaying rye. All this is gone and half-forgotten, and only in theaters and museums of national culture do these traditions still live a phantom life. Their place in the village has been taken by the Party cell, the Komsomol "nucleus," the club, the cinema, the ZAGS (marriage registry office), the meeting, "the distinguished milkmaid," "the outstanding shepherd." Not all these innovations are necessarily bad, but all bear the stamp of official regimentation. They are the same everywhere—in the Ukraine and in Georgia, in Russia and Byelorussia, in Turkestan and in Karelia. This uniformity deprives the countryside of its national individuality and results in general uniformity. An Udmurd village today is as little distinguished from a Bashkir or Ukrainian village as the Udmurd town Izhevsk is from Bashkir Ufa or Ukrainian Poltava.

The growing similarity between town and village and between villages of various nationalities has been accentuated since 1950 when, under the policy of the enlargement of collective farms, the campaign was started for the final liquidation of the peasantry as a class¹⁶ and for the transformation of collective farmers into agricultural laborers, and of old-type villages into large workers' settlements or agricultural towns ("agro-towns"). The process has begun; it may still be delayed or deflected, but *under the present régime* it cannot be stopped. The old village with its still lingering national characteristics is doomed.

Everything is changing—the towns, the countryside, the social environment, and man himself. This happens everywhere, but in the USSR these changes are brought about by force; they have their specific tempo, and their specific objective—to bring forth a new Soviet man, a new Soviet nation.

¹⁶With regard to the enlargement of collective farms, see the exhaustive article by B. I. Nikolaevsky, "The New Campaign Against the Peasants," *The Russian Review*, April, 1951.

The Lost Dostoevsky Manuscripts

BY RENÉ FUELOEP-MILLER

DOSTOEVSKY was the immediate cause of my journey to Soviet Russia, but I had begun preparing for it long ago, in early childhood. When I was a boy, our French governess, Charlotte, had to leave our small town in a hurry after a scandalous love affair, and I inherited her room. In the drawer of her night table I found Dostoevsky's *Idiot*; in her haste she had left the book behind. On the following nights I read Dostoevsky until dawn, and this first reading put me in bondage to him for life.

At boarding school the lights were turned off at nine o'clock at night. The day was completely taken up with a rigid course of studies, including Latin, Greek, and mathematics, and our leisure hours were spent on botanical expeditions and soccer games. Our only time for reading was during the boring, near-sighted geography teacher's hour. Four of us sat in the last row, which was reserved for bad pupils, and formed a regular reading club. One of us read Jules Verne's adventurous science fiction, the other Rilke's early poems, the third forbidden romances, and I read Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, *Notes from the Underground* and *The Possessed*.

I devoured *The Brothers Karamazov* when I was a pharmacist's apprentice in a small Transylvanian town. I read while I was distilling water, mixing salves, and making pills. In Paris, where I studied psychiatry at the Salpêtrière, I was encouraged by Professor Babinsky (Charcot's successor) to work on a paper dealing with the remarkable functional connections between Dostoevsky's attacks of epilepsy (which like Mohammed he called his "holy sickness") and his literary productivity.

In the early twenties the "uncrowned queen of Viennese literature," Gina K. (at present a movie writer in Hollywood) set up the editorial staff of her literary magazine at two marble tables in the Café Herrenhof. Her contributors sat at other tables in the coffee house. The waiters were the magazine's messenger service and Jean, the "Ober," acted as treasurer for the magazine. He took in the subscription money and paid the contributors—though rarely in actual cash; payment for contributions was generally reckoned against the consumption of coffee, sandwiches, and drinks.

One day I received a telephone call from the coffee house asking me to come to the table of the editor-in-chief at once. Gina told me that she had just received a sensational inside report from Soviet Russia of the discovery of a private notebook of Dostoevsky's, in which the writer had noted down his epileptic attacks and the literary inspirations each had yielded. There was something up my alley, she pointed out; I must go to Russia and see for myself. I was intoxicated at the prospect of going to the "land of the possessed" and of laying my hands on Dostoevsky's own notebook. But after a few drinks I sobered up and began to worry about how I was going to finance the expedition. The amount Gina offered me for an article on Dostoevsky's notebook was at most good for fifty cups of coffee, ten brandies, and perhaps a week's worth of sandwiches; certainly not enough for a trip to Russia. Jean, "the Ober," suggested a moneylender who would advance the money to me for a half share in the profits. But the moneylender was both skeptical of Dostoevsky's immortality and dubious that I would ever return safely from the land of the Bolsheviks.

If you hang on to a dream it is always fulfilled—that is a magical law. Shortly afterward, I attended a literary and political gathering at the salon of one of Vienna's celebrated hostesses. Mr. L., the editor of a large daily newspaper, was lecturing on the effects the New Economic Policy, recently instituted in the Soviet Union, would have upon capitalist countries. The important thing, he said, was to have eyewitness reports of actual conditions in Soviet Russia. I proposed to Mr. L. that he send me to Russia as a special correspondent. He doubted whether I had the economic and political background for such an assignment, but my "courage" impressed him. He agreed to send me for a trial period and guaranteed me a modest but adequate salary.

Two weeks later I was in the land of the Possessed and the Karamazovs. My experience was similar to that of the man who went looking for a donkey and found a kingdom. I had come for a small notebook and I discovered crates—full of completely unknown posthumous works by Dostoevsky—material for more than ten volumes. Circumstances simply dropped these treasures into my lap.

Caché after caché of Dostoevsky manuscripts turned up. For example, the nationalization of Soviet banks entailed the opening of the safe-deposit boxes. In the box belonging to Dostoevsky's widow was found a sealed tin container filled with precious unknown

Dostoevsky manuscripts. During the Revolution the local Cheka at Sebastopol had confiscated other manuscripts in the possession of Dostoevsky's son Fredya. These became the property of the state. And a thief who had broken into Dostoevsky's villa in the Caucasus had taken away still other manuscripts. He wrote a letter to Commissar Pokrovsky offering to turn over the stolen papers for the sum of twelve million *chervontsy* and a guaranty of immunity. The Soviet Commissariat decided that it would be "an un-Soviet act" to transact business with a thief, and gave orders for the letter writer to be found and arrested. But the thief was never caught. Nevertheless, through a set of strange circumstances I ultimately obtained his manuscripts.

The various finds consisted of hitherto unknown fragments of Dostoevsky's famous novels, magnificent drafts of unfinished stories and other novels, private notebooks with illuminating literary and political entries, and confessional letters of Dostoevsky's. Together the material showed Dostoevsky the man, the novelist, and the prophet, in a wholly new light. Later, in Vienna, I showed parts of the manuscripts to Professor Freud who was so impressed by them that he wrote his now-famous Dostoevsky study as introduction to my edition of the unknown parts of *The Brothers Karamazov*.

The Party line with regard to Dostoevsky had not been definitely settled at that time. In the twenties Soviet Russia had a schizophrenic attitude toward many of the Russian classic writers, especially Dostoevsky. On the one hand, the classics were the pride of Russian culture; on the other hand, they were a frequent source of embarrassment to the new rulers of Russia, when it came to putting out the official state edition of many of their works. Tolstoy was fairly easy to deal with. It was just a matter of omitting the word "God" from his novels and dismissing his ethical and political writings as "senile products of Tolstoy's old age." He was then acceptable. Gogol's reactionary religiosity could be ascribed to the breakdown of his sanity in his last years. But Dostoevsky was a tougher problem. Lunacharsky, the intellectual who ran the People's Commissariat of Culture, tried desperately to groom Dostoevsky for the rôle of prophet of the glorious Bolshevik Revolution. But after both Lenin and Gorky condemned Dostoevsky, another tack had to be tried. The only possible solution was to turn Dostoevsky into a museum piece. His manuscripts, his pen, and his snuffbox were placed under glass. The disquieting Dostoevsky manuscripts were stored away in locked archives. The Soviet State Publishing

House (Gosizdat) had nationalized Dostoevsky's posthumous works, but at the time showed no inclination to pollute the bright young culture of Soviet Russia by publishing them.

Money would purchase these treasures, I was sure, but I did not bother my head with ways and means of getting the needed money. I was so excited over my finds that financial obstacles seemed insignificant. Every financier in the world, I imagined, would jump at the chance of financing my project.

My chief problem at the moment was to obtain connections with the proper Soviet authorities who could give me the world rights to the first publication of the Dostoevsky manuscripts. I ran into the man I needed in a large Soviet grocery store in Moscow. He was busy buying pounds of cheese and caviar. It was Konstantin Oumansky, later Soviet Ambassador to the United States. I had met him long ago in Vienna cafés. Kostya Oumansky, as a young poet, had stormed the Viennese literary circles like a miniature Rimbaud and won the admiration of the entire coffee house set with his poems. While still boyish in features and build, he had given up revolutionizing literature and applied himself to world revolution. In spite of his youth, Kostya now held an important political position. He was chief of the international press service, Chicherin's right-hand man in foreign politics and an influential adviser on Soviet cultural policy.

During Kostya's pre-revolutionary years we had spent many a night in the cafés talking enthusiastically about Dostoevsky. I reminded him of this and asked him to help me.

"One more proof of how hopelessly reactionary you bourgeois are," he said scornfully. "The world is on the way to building the true millenium of culture and you people are still at the intellectual stage of *picanthropus erectus*. Dostoevsky's posthumous works can be of interest only to a paleontologist who is looking for the missing link connecting the anthropoids of the bourgeois nineteenth century with the real human beings of the Soviet Union."

I interrupted to give him regards from the habitués of the Café Herrenhof. "Gina K. . . ." I began.

"Is she as pretty as ever?" Kostya asked. Then he caught himself for having fallen back into the tone of his old frivolities, and said irritably, "But the devil with her prettiness and all the stale allures of poetry-writing café women in high-heeled shoes. Our women in soldier's boots are writing with sickles and guns the heroic epic of Soviet history."

He allowed me a moment for this resounding slogan to sink in, and then agreed to help me for old time's sake. But before I buried myself in useless studies of the "bourgeois sub-man" he wanted me to take a look at the glorious future of the new Soviet man. He felt sure, he said, that after I had been shown around I would give up my silly projects and apply my energies more worthily to the furtherance of Soviet society.

He took me first to the Bryusov Institute. On the way there he briefed me on what I was to see. "You old-hats still believe in such nonsense as poetic genius, creative personalities and inspiration, of course. Our Pavlov has unmasked this bourgeois deception for good. Poetry and art are nothing but the physiological products of conditioned reflexes. Here you will see how we produce art."

The Bryusov Institute consisted of two sections. One was "a laboratory for synthetic word chemistry," where moods were chemically analyzed, distilled according to revolutionary formulas, and compounded. The second section was "a collective workshop for the mechanistic production of epics, dramas, and novels." Above the entrance was the inscription: "Literature is a hammer in the fist of the proletariat." Inside, the walls were hung with various flashcards showing "patterns for agitation," drawn up by Demian Bedny. There was a "rage-pathos pattern," a "pattern for ruthless hatred," and so on. The head of the workshop boasted of his collective's high production: a semi-annual output of seventy-four poems, twenty-seven novels, and sixteen dramas. "Every one of them produced mechanistically and politically reliable—not a single slip-up in the lot."

"But suppose somebody in this collective has an idea of his own that doesn't fit into the rage-pathos pattern?" I asked Oumansky in a whisper. "It could happen, couldn't it?"

"Out of the question," Kostya replied. "The poetry section of our Cheka checks everything to see that no retrogressive material is allowed to emerge."

After that, Oumansky took me to a performance of "a symphony of factory sirens." The conductor stood in a tower above the roofs and by waving flags gave the signs for the adagio, allegretto, and prestos of the sirens. Then we listened to a performance by an orchestra which had dispensed entirely with conductors—symbol of the individualistic era of music. It was a noisy symphony in which the sounds, in accordance with the new age of the proletariat and

the machine, were produced by motors, turbines, sirens, automobile horns, and similar instruments.

The climax of my initiation into the new revolutionary art was a remarkable performance of Hamlet. The curtainless stage was in the center of the audience. The scenery consisted of all sorts of gymnastic apparatus—swings, trapezes, high bars, horses. The play began. Scene after scene the actors performed gymnastic stunts, without ever saying a word. During one scene the protagonist on the horizontal bar swung several times toward the female gymnast on the same bar. Oumansky whispered enthusiastically, "Isn't that a marvelous scene? Nowhere else in the world can you see Hamlet performed like this."

"I'm sure of that," I stammered in embarrassment. "But just which scene is this?"

"What's the matter with you? Don't you have any feeling for real art? Can't you see this is the great scene with Ophelia?"

Afterwards, as I rode home with Kostya, I gently returned to the subject of Dostoevsky's posthumous works. He was annoyed, but finally he said: "If that old junk will make you and your motheaten bourgeois readers happy—and if you really want to pay for the stuff—all right. After all, we need American dollars to rebuild our culture; money's more important than a pile of dusty manuscripts."

Oumansky took me to meet Lunacharsky, People's Commissar for Culture and Education. He was a frustrated man. He was still something of a cultured "European," but his opinions were overridden by the more radical of the cultural Bolsheviks. In our very first conversation I saw that he would be cooperative. He would have liked very much to publish Dostoevsky's posthumous works himself, but the climate of the time prohibited it. At his recommendation the State Publishing House agreed to sell world rights to the Dostoevsky manuscripts to me. But the sum demanded by the business managers of the State Publishing House was considerable.

All along I had nursed the foolhardy assurance that I would be able to raise the necessary cash by writing to the Swedish match king, Kreuger, the Ruhr industrialist, Stinnes, and the famous Viennese financier, Castiglioni. So I blithely signed the contract. What really had me worried was the down payment, which I had to hand in within a few days.

My first scheme for raising the initial money was romantic and literary. I knew from the letters in the Dostoevsky manuscripts

that the novelist had spent ten years as a gambler, trying to win at roulette the money he needed to go on writing *The Idiot*, *The Possessed*, and his other great works. I decided to follow his example. And the plan was feasible, for the Soviet government had temporarily lifted the ban on the ineradicable vice of gambling in order to obtain revenue for the building of schools.

Dostoevsky had worked out a system, based on his years of gambling, which guaranteed winnings if only the gambler "kept calm," as he phrased it. His own excitable temperament spoiled his chances, however, and so he always lost back whatever he had won. But I was not burdened by his genius, his illness, or his unhappy life. I decided that I could keep calm at the gaming table and apply his excellent system. Since I had just received my week's pay from my newspaper, I went to the famous Moscow NEP gambling club, the Sonn. After a few bets I doubled my money, and by the time the casino closed I had tripled it. By the following night I would have the full down payment. But Dostoevsky's bad luck had been transmitted to me. Next day I lost back my winnings and my stake as well, down to the last *chervonets*.

I spent a sleepless night. Finally a thought came to me. Not knowing what I would run into in Russia, I had come equipped with an extensive wardrobe. I had brought suits for every season, custom-made by the best tailors of Vienna and Prague, and I had ample changes of shirts, hats, shoes, and ties in my luggage. I had also brought along several boxes of my favorite French and German books. These articles could certainly be sold.

My first thought was to take my place in the so-called "bourgeois lineup" at Smolenski Rynok, where the ladies and gentlemen of Tsarist society stood and offered their last possessions for sale. But these down-at-the-heels aristocrats had, in their timidity, ruined the market prices; I would never get the sum I needed there. Then I recalled that the patrons of the small restaurants where I usually had my supper, people who wore Russian blouses or worn, shiny suits, always admired my clothes and fingered the cloth greedily. I suggested to the proprietor (a former diamond merchant) that, for a share in the proceeds, he help me auction off my books and wardrobe. He agreed, and after the midnight supper which is customary in Moscow, we went to his apartment. He invited his acquaintances, and in no time at all I was rid of my entire wardrobe except for a tuxedo and a pair of patent leather shoes—articles of clothing for which there was little need in this proletarian world. I glanced

at the tuxedo and the shoes which were left and my "Communist" conscience suddenly awoke. What need had I of the capitalistic luxury of two suits and two pairs of shoes? And so I called out: "The suit and shoes I have on are also for sale." They almost ripped the suit off my back. I put on the tuxedo, the dress-shirt, and the patent-leather shoes and began auctioning off the books. In that costume and with a wad of money in my pocket, I left the scene of my triumph as an old-clothes dealer.

"Clothes make the man." The proverb certainly proved true as far as my status with the people in Moscow was concerned. My own personality was swallowed up by the tuxedo, and soon I lost even my name. At first they spoke of me simply as "the tuxedo"; later on most people addressed me as "Grazhdanin Tuxedo."

I made the down payment. The contract with Gosizdat was safe—if I could raise the rest of the money. But Stinnes appeared to be too busy with his holding companies, Kreuger with his Swedish matches, and Castiglioni with financing Reinhardt—at any rate none of the three answered my appeal. More than a week had gone by already. I began to feel a fluttering in my stomach, the first symptom of desperation.

From a secretary in the Austrian consulate I heard that Baron R., a financial tycoon, would be arriving from Vienna. I waited for him impatiently. He was a well-known personage in Vienna, the last baron of the last monarch of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Emperor, fleeing from his country, had just got aboard his special train when a member of his suite whispered to him: "Your Majesty, there is Herr R., your Majesty's staunchest supporter. Perhaps a little word from your Majesty. . . ." In the tempest of events the Emperor had forgotten to sign the document which was to raise Herr R. to the nobility. Good-naturedly, he beckoned Herr R. to approach, shook hands with him warmly and said, "I thank you, Baron R." Next moment the train rolled out.

These last words of the last Emperor were a greater confirmation of Herr R.'s right to the title than the imperial signature on a document would have been. The time came when even the Schwarzenbergs, Lichtensteins, and Auersbergs were addressed simply as "Herr," but Baron R. kept his title. For even the republicans—genial Viennese that they were—felt sympathy for the last Baron of the monarchy, who was also the first "red baron," the first European business man to favor an accord with Soviet Russia and doing busi-

ness with the Reds. He was now coming to Russia to exchange Russian sugar and grain for Austrian industrial products.

This man, a person of tremendous initiative and daring in business, was just the man to finance my plan. I found the anteroom of his suite in the Savoy Hotel filled with a wildly gesticulating horde of speculators, money-changers, interpreters, and what would nowadays be called five-percenters. In their faces and gestures you could read all the avarice which had been repressed during War Communism and which had now been let loose among Soviet citizens by the New Economic Policy.

My press card from the Viennese daily got me in at once. The three secretaries in the Baron's anteroom functioned like policemen to clear a way for me through the mob of speculators. The Baron was sitting at his desk like a little Napoleon of commerce, simultaneously telephoning, dictating contracts to a staff of secretaries, and receiving market reports. Continuing each of his activities, he greeted me cordially (since my report to the newspaper might have been helpful to his negotiations in Russia) and listened attentively to my project. The word "Dostoevsky" was Greek to him. With his mind taken up all day long by quantities, he at first asked automatically, "How much does the stuff weigh?"

"I haven't weighed it yet," I answered, "and I suppose it wouldn't come to very many pounds, but I can assure you that it is goods of remarkable quality and I know the European market for it." I boasted that I could guarantee him a double and possibly a tenfold return on his investment, and I offered to go to Europe at once to arrange the sale.

"How much?" he asked.

"Sixteen thousand dollars; with traveling and personal expenses, \$16,500."

"Make out the check," he said to his secretary, waving his hand casually. But as he was signing the check he looked up inquiringly. "By the way, just what is this thing Dostoevsky?"

"Wonderful novels," I said.

"Novels, novels," he repeated, and he paused for a second to think hard. "Not by what's his name, that old Count who doesn't eat meat and stitches his own shoes? Come on, you know the one I mean. Tolstoy!" he cried out suddenly, relieved that the name had come to him.

He did not listen to my reply. He was already talking to a sugar refiner who was calling him from Kiev. He threw a glance at my

tuxedo, which I was now wearing in broad daylight. "Agreed, Chapiro," he shouted into the telephone, and then asked whether I was invited to a banquet. I smiled idiotically. There would have been no point of explaining about the tuxedo. He could not have lent me his suit, for he was short and I was tall. Besides, I already felt wedded to my tuxedo.

At that time trade and financial relations with Russia were very new and very primitive. I had to go to Vienna to cash the check and return with American dollars.

A new phase of my adventure began in Vienna. My train arrived early in the morning. From the station I went directly to Baron R.'s bank and stood outside, waiting for it to open so that I could cash my check. The hour for the opening of banks passed, and still the bank remained closed. I knocked; I pounded on the door. Passers-by stopped. They looked at my evening dress with amusement. "Well," someone said to me, "the gentleman seems t've been up all night in Romacher's (the night-club on the corner). Guess he doesn't know the bank has had a slight upset. Baron R. overreached himself on Russian grain and sugar and the bank has had to stop payments and close its doors. You'd better go home and sleep it off."

What was I to do now? In Russia the manuscripts were waiting for me to come and redeem them. But there was no reason to despair. For there was in Vienna a man—more than a man, a Viennese institution—who always had good advice for all who didn't know where to turn. He was a Viennese "*staretz*," a person like the sages of old. Rather, he was the personification of sagacity, and hundreds of legends had gathered around him. His name was Friedrich Eckstein. Mark Twain, who knew him, loved him and honored him, immortalized him under the name of "Mac Eck."

In Vienna where literature, painting, music, philosophy, and business all started in the coffee house, it was only natural that Mac Eck should receive at a coffee house table. In one corner of the Café Imperial he sat enthroned from morn till midnight. He wore a goatee, and his eyes had a Chinese slant. Not even his intimates knew his age. Julius, the old headwaiter at the Imperial, claimed that Mac Eck had been sitting in the same corner of the Café when he, Julius, was starting life as a busboy. Mac Eck was ageless. And every one of the celebrities of Vienna came to his table: Ferdinand Bruckner, Hugo Wolff, and Johann Strauss, Madame Blavatsky and Annie Besant, Rudolf Steiner, Freud, Alred Adler, and Trotsky—all came to consult him. When Hugo von Hofmannsthal was

worried about an act of a play, when Werfel and Rilke felt uncertain about a poem, they came to Eckstein. Architects asked him to approve their blueprints, mathematicians their equations, physicists their formulas, composers their scores. Judges and psychoanalysts asked his advice about their cases; Hegelians and Marxists consulted him about their interpretations; actors asked him about their parts, historians about their theories of history. Even the imperial Master of Court Protocol came one day to consult Mac Eck about a debatable point in Spanish etiquette. Mac Eck knew everything about everything. If anyone wanted to know the names of the principal rivers of Paraguay, the principles of the neo-Thomist movement, when the first romantic poem was published, or even when toothbrushes first came into use, he asked Mac Eck.

Mac Eck was as well up on practical affairs as he was on intellectual matters. He could tell art dealers which rich man in Europe was interested in a particular specimen of early Renaissance art; he could advise booksellers on the value of first editions, and he knew who in Europe would be willing to finance what.

So I went to the Imperial. Naturally, Mac Eck knew just what manuscripts of Dostoevsky's were unpublished. He knew the importance of each manuscript for modern literature and knew just the right man to finance my undertaking. He gave me the name of Dr. Kaufmann, legal adviser to a Viennese bank, who was a great lover of Dostoevsky and who would organize a group to finance my plan. It turned out just as he said. Dr. Edmund Kaufmann (at present an international lawyer in New York) sent me the sum I needed and an extra thousand dollars in case I turned up more manuscripts in Russia. Superstitiously, I took my tuxedo back to Russia, for it had brought me luck there.

News of my return, and word that "the fool in the tuxedo" was paying good dollars for worthless rights to Dostoevsky manuscripts, penetrated to the remotest corners of the Soviet Union. Innumerable letters, diaries, memoirs, and relics were turned up which had been piously kept in trunks and attics by nieces, grandnieces, distant relatives, and friends of Dostoevsky. I had to set up an office with files and secretaries to take care of all the offers and invitations that came pouring in. I traveled to Leningrad, Tver, and the Caucasus, for it appeared that all over Russia there were unpublished manuscripts, unpublished letters. A year sped by in sifting and working through the crates of Dostoevsky material I was accumulating.

One evening, in a night club, a pretty hatcheck girl slipped a note

into my hand. "I'll expect you tomorrow morning at five," the note read, and gave her address. She was so attractive that I went without thinking twice about it. But my reception was not quite what I had expected. She was waiting for me dressed in a sheepskin coat and a Russian cap, ready for going out. "Come along," she said mysteriously. I followed her for blocks and blocks until we came to an apartment house. A frail old woman was supervising the scrubbing of the staircase by a squad of at least ten vigorous young women. When I appeared with my companion, the old woman led us into her tiny room. "This is the gentleman," the cloakroom girl said to her. "You can trust him."

I found that I was in the Russian underground. The hatcheck girl was a former princess. The old lady had served as first lady-in-waiting under three Tsars. Dostoevsky had read his works aloud at her salon and had made her the gift of the manuscript of one of his political essays. She offered it to me in order to keep it from falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

When I called to take possession of the nationalized manuscripts at the State Publishing House, one bundle was missing and could not be located. One day when I was ill my doctor handed me the missing sheets. I had to swear that I would not say a word about it, for if I did he would end up in a cell in the Lubyanka. All the while I was in Moscow I kept the manuscript concealed under my shirt. It contained an unpublished passage from *The Possessed* expressing bitter condemnation of Communism.

"*Pazhalusta!*" a droshky driver called to me one day as I left my house. This was the usual phrase that *izvoshchiks* used to lure passengers into their vehicles. I was going to walk, and waved him away. At the corner he came driving up to me again, calling out, "*Pazhalusta!*" No matter where I turned he continued to follow me. At last I gave up and got in. "I'll take you for a pleasure ride for nothing," he said. As soon as we reached the outskirts of the city he took a small package out of his coat and handed it to me. It was from the thief who had stolen the Dostoevsky manuscripts in the Caucasus. A letter accompanied the manuscript. The thief wrote that he was the descendant of a long line of Tsarist army officers. His conscience would not let him turn the manuscripts over to the Bolsheviks, he wrote.

My problem now was to get all my treasures across the border without trouble. My chief secretary, a tubercular fellow named Behrmann, had been absolutely invaluable to me. I had volun-

tarily doubled his salary, which had been set by the State Publishing House, and since then he had been my grateful friend. As the time for my departure approached, he noticed my growing concern and saw that in spite of his optimistic assurances my uneasiness was increasing daily.

One night there unexpectedly took place between us a thoroughly Russian confessional scene. There was something he had to tell me in return for all my kindnesses, he said, and he knew he could trust my discretion. He confessed that he was an agent of the Cheka; he had been ordered to win my trust in order to gather information about me.

I could scarcely believe it. "You, Behrmann, whom I thought my friend—you are a Cheka agent, a low informer. . . !"

"Please don't judge me harshly," he said, his voice shaking. "It's forced on me. We are made to spy on everybody, father, brother, friends. Your other secretary and your servant, the man who tends the furnace, the clerk in the Austrian consulate, the proprietor of the restaurant who helped you at the auction, your friends—they are all spies."

"Then why this confession now?" I asked, disgusted. "You might at least have left me with the illusion that you were my friend."

"Because I hate and despise myself for doing what I must do, and I hate those who force me to do it. But I am the son of a Menshevik and I would long ago have ended up in jail if I didn't spy on foreigners who need an interpreter or secretary."

"You can depend on me not to give you away," I said coldly.

"No, I don't want you to go away thinking so badly of me," he cried out. "I want you to realize that I can still be honorable, even as a Cheka agent. I know I am doing something I should not do now. But I want you to know I am really a friend."

He took a folded paper out of his pocket. It was his report on my preparations for leaving, on my recent visitors, my conversations, the contents of my luggage. "I hope you won't mind my calling you a literary snob and a fool in evening dress," he said as he handed me the paper. "That is done just to help you out—so they won't think you're a spy."

The report was couched in such terms that I could really have started for the border without a qualm, if I had not had those secret documents which even Behrmann knew nothing about. For a moment I thought of telling him the cause of my anxiety. But I

decided not to, although I certainly should have been able to trust him fully at this point. By telling him I would be trying his informer's conscience and possibly involving him in danger as an accomplice. But when I left, I shook hands with him warmly and, as a sign that I forgave him, I kissed him on both cheeks in the Russian fashion.

Everyone who has crossed borders knows by experience that the cleverest and best-laid schemes for smuggling contraband across the border only too often go awry. Success is mostly a matter of luck, and luck is often no more than the inspiration of the moment.

In addition to the trunks full of Dostoevsky manuscripts, I also had several crates containing icons, objets d'art, new poems, and various other legitimate souvenirs. The inspection of this huge quantity of luggage held the train up on the Finnish border longer than usual. The customs officials and Cheka agents were not particularly impressed by my official export permit. They decided to make spot checks. Anything and everyone that passes the Soviet frontier is suspect.

On the spur of the moment I readily and calmly opened the first trunk which contained the secretly acquired papers, for which I had no export permit. I put these papers, which could have easily gotten me into trouble, on the table under the very nose of the chief customs officer. Pointing ostentatiously to them I said, "There, you see." At the same time I stood in front of the other trunks, shielding them from view. The Chekist turned his attention to these at once. "What are you hiding there?" he demanded. "Go and look," he ordered one of his subordinates. "I'm not hiding anything," I said. "Then open those trunks at once," he ordered.

Of course, I could not find the key. "Aha," he said, "you found the key fast enough for this stuff here—" he pointed to the papers on the table. "But you can't find the key for this other trunk. Very interesting. We happen to want this one opened." I assured him that the trunk held nothing but innocent letters for which I had an export permit.

"We know all about that. We heard that story yesterday from a man we caught smuggling. We're going to examine that trunk." He ordered his men to break it open. "We'll examine those innocent letters carefully, very carefully," he said, glaring at me.

They broke open the suspect trunk. It contained Dostoevsky's letters to his wife during his gambling period. The customs official read every one of them with pedantic care. Some of the passages, in

which Dostoevsky referred to his plan to write the *Life of a Great Sinner*, he passed on to his assistant for a double check. Apparently the assistant knew something about gambling, for he became so absorbed in the letters that his superior at last asked him impatiently whether he had discovered anything. Finally, the trunk was virtually taken apart; the lining was ripped open and the leather carefully examined to see whether anything was pasted or sewed inside it. Meanwhile, other officials had gone through the rest of my baggage with equal care. They took the icons out of their frames and then searched my person thoroughly. The only things they overlooked were the papers I had laid on the table. Finally, when they had found nothing and the train crew was getting impatient, these papers were hastily stuffed back into the trunks along with everything else. The train started at last and some minutes later I was on Finnish soil.

The following year (1925), the first volumes of Dostoevsky's posthumous works were published, not in Russian by the Moscow State Publishing House, but by Piper & Company, Munich, in the German language.

The Soviet Intelligentsia

BY JAY W. STEIN

FROM the early years of its régime the Soviet Union has given recurring attention to the problem of defining its "intelligentsia" and setting forth the important rôle it fills in the operation of the Soviet state. Without entering into a detailed analysis of Soviet administrative and socio-economic structure, the paragraphs which follow set forth the underlying executory and intermediary meaning of the term so frequently used in Soviet writings.

When the Bolshevik revolutionaries in 1917 took on the tremendous task of operating a government, as well as an entire society, they were forced to make use of Tsarist-trained intellectuals and civil servants. These were the individuals who possessed the envied skills necessary for the administration and operation of the state. But, according to the Soviets, they isolated themselves and demonstrated feelings of superiority to those who were non-intelligentsia.

During the first years after the Revolution, this suspicion still continued. At the same time, the need for more technical experts and brain workers increased. The Soviet government began to set up elaborate programs through which the old Tsarist intelligentsia would help to train a new Soviet intelligentsia which could be trusted without hesitancy. Stalin's oft-quoted rationalization for a strictly Soviet intelligentsia states that "since no ruling class has ever existed without its own private intelligentsia, new phases in the rule of the working class in the Soviet Union required the creation of its very own productive-technical intelligentsia."¹ With this Marxist twist, Soviet writers use the term "intelligentsia" to mean a "stratum" serving the ruling proletariat and recruited from both worker and peasant classes.

The view of the Soviet intelligentsia as a stratum rather than a class is implicit in Article One of the Soviet Constitution (1936), which defines the Soviet Union as a "socialist state of workers and peasants." It is found in the pronouncements of Stalin and others. As in the Bolshevik program for attracting into government and economic activity more and more of the masses of workers and peasants, Stalin acclaimed the birth and proletarian integration of

¹M. Protsko, "Intelligentsiya strany sotsializma," *Bolshevik*, 6, March 30, 1949, p. 11.

numerous new Soviet intelligentsia advanced from the working class ranks, peasantry, and Soviet employees—"flesh and blood of our people."² He reported that by 1936, 80 to 90 percent of the intelligentsia came to be offspring of "the working class, the peasantry, and other strata of laborers."³ An official Party congress three years later stated that "the intelligentsia had become a completely new intelligentsia rooted in the working class and the peasantry and comprising yesterday's workers and peasants and the sons of workers and peasants who have moved to command posts."⁴ Propagating the idea of a worker-peasant mass base for intelligentsia in the Soviet state and supplementing it with the concept of "perfect moral-political unity" among its social and economic strata, the Soviet leaders wielded a powerful propaganda weapon for mass support. While this mass base claim has a strained validity in a second generation totalitarian state, the Soviet Union has carried it through to a grossly extended use and ultimate meaning of the word "intelligentsia."

In the thirties the new Soviet trainees in government, industry, and propaganda began very largely to replace the old intelligentsia borrowed from the Tsarist régime. They began to assume a special rôle in mental activity and skilled labor in the Soviet planned society. In the light of socialism's tenets on equality, a sharp differentiation between mental and physical labor was unacceptable. The Soviet attempt to eliminate much of this understandable differentiation has contributed to the rather loose extension of the word "intelligentsia" in the Soviet state. The word has come to include persons in nearly all realms of responsible and executory activity in the fulfillment of state plans.

One of the most detailed analyses of the scope of the word as defined in the Soviet state was in an official report by Molotov in 1939.⁵ It consisted of two tables, one covering the "managing and administrative cadres," the other the "cadres of intelligentsia as a whole."

Directing and administrative intelligentsia as of January, 1937, were as follows:

²I. V. Stalin, "Otchetnyi doklad na XVIII s'ezde Partii," *Voprosy Leninizma*, Moscow, 1947, p. 589.

³Stalin, "O proekte knositutsii Soiuza SSR," *Voprosy*, p. 512.

⁴"Rezoliutsiya XVIII s'ezda VKP(B)," *Pravda*, March 22, 1939, p. 2.

⁵V. M. Molotov, "Doklad na XVIII s'ezde VKP(B)," *Pravda*, March 16, 1939, p. 5.

1. Heads of administrative, health, and cultural enterprises	450,000
2. Directors and administrators of food enterprises, shops, and sections	350,000
3. Chairmen and deputy chairmen of collective farms, administrators of commercial farms	582,000
4. Directors of motor transport stations and state farms, managers of state farms	19,000
5. Directors of food-cooperative organizations	40,000
6. Directors and administrators of stores	250,000
7. Directors and administrators of dining enterprises	60,000
	<hr/> 1,751,000

Intelligentsia as a whole were grouped in Molotov's report as follows:

1. Heads of enterprises, firms, shops, farms, etc.	1,751,000
2. Engineers and architects	250,000
3. Intermediate technical personnel (technicians, foremen, foresters, railway station chiefs, etc.)	810,000
4. Agronomists	80,000
5. Other agro-technical personnel (surveyors, plant and animal husbandmen, etc.)	96,000
6. Workers (<i>rabotniki</i>) ⁶ of science (professors and teachers of higher educational institutions)	80,000
7. Scholars and other teachers	969,000
8. Cultural-educational workers (<i>rabotniki</i>) (journalists, librarians, club administrators)	297,000
9. Workers (<i>rabotniki</i>) of art	159,000
10. Physicians	132,000
11. Intermediate medical personnel (surgeons' assistants, accoucheurs, nurses)	382,000
12. Economists, statisticians	822,000
13. Bookkeepers, accountants	1,617,000
14. Legal-procurator workers (<i>rabotniki</i>)	46,000
15. Students in higher education	550,000
16. Other groups of intelligentsia (including military intelligentsia)	1,550,000
	<hr/> 9,591,000

⁶The term *rabotnik* is used to distinguish a skilled from a non-skilled worker (*rabochii*). To a large extent this distinction has come to parallel that between intelligentsia and non-intelligentsia in the Soviet Union.

It is noted upon glancing at the above tables that the Bolshevik Party is not mentioned. Although most of the administrative intelligentsia in industry and agriculture and many of the lesser intelligentsia may be members of the Party, it is not apparent where in the above groupings top-level Bolsheviks who devote full time to deciding on policy would fall. Soviet theory, of course, proposes that the Bolshevik Party is not to be differentiated from the people and certainly not from those who operate the government and economy. Nevertheless, in the Soviet state Bolshevik Party members are regarded separately not only from the masses but also from other intelligentsia.

A small, highly select group, the Bolshevik Party at the end of World War II comprised around five percent of the total population of the country. Party propaganda and literature, particularly at election time, repeatedly remind intelligentsia and the masses of the highly select membership and superior rôle of the Party in Soviet society. The Party is called the "highest form of class unity of the proletariat," the inspirer and creator of the moral-political unity of the Soviet people.⁸ In words of Lenin, "the Bolshevik Party is the intelligence, honor, and conscience of our era."⁹

The salient feature in the rôle of the Bolshevik Party or upper intelligentsia is its monopolistic control of the Soviet government, a control justified by what is called its "profoundly scientific" policy based on the "most advanced teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin," a science to aid the Party in foreseeing the course of events both present and future.¹⁰ Although sharply segmented between upper-level and lower-level party members, this strict political control pervades the entire economic life of the country and opposes all activity contrary to the interests of the planned state.¹¹ According to Soviet economic determinism this means the Bolshevik direction of all social and cultural life as well. Thus the Party is "the directing core of all workers' organizations, both public and state," and works out their over-all line of activity.¹² The Party furnishes

⁸Stalin, "K voprosam Leninizma," *Voprosy*, p. 120.

⁹B. Burkov, "Moralno-politicheskoe edinstvo sovetского obshchestva," *Bolshevik*, 4, February, 1950, p. 22.

¹⁰As quoted in G. Gak, "Voprosy etiki v Marksistsko-Leninskom mirovozzrenii," *Bolshevik*, 9, May 15, 1948, p. 38.

¹¹S. Titarenko, *Sovetskii stroi—samyi demokraticeskii v mire*, Moscow, 1946, p. 52.

¹²L. Gatovsky, "Politika i ekonomika neotdelimy," *Pravda*, July 14, 1947, p. 2.

¹³V. Karpinsky, *Osnovy prava i obiazannosti grazhdan SSSR*, Moscow, 1946, p. 53.

guiding direction and moral-political stimulation to intelligentsia,¹³ while it claims to have exclusive knowledge and, therefore, exclusive rights to determine how and in what direction to lead the masses.¹⁴ As such an exclusive heritage, the "scientific learning and prescient powers" of the Party are hardly shared by non-Party intelligentsia and much less by the masses.

Soviet political and social theory often refers to the basic indifference of the masses, their inability to know what is best for them, their ignorance of the "laws of social development," and the "inevitability of Bolshevik rule and Soviet society." Referring to a "higher type of democracy," Soviet analyses of society attach major significance to how the Party organizes millions of the masses and attracts them into conscious participation in the building of a socialist way of life. "The construction of socialism [among the masses] proceeds not of its own accord, not in a system of natural development of the economic and social forces";¹⁵ rather, the Bolsheviks must head the popular masses and make them politically enlightened and imbued with the necessity of socialism, otherwise it cannot be achieved.¹⁶ Similarly, the masses are unable to embrace the proper "spirit of Soviet patriotism, based on boundless devotion to the interests of the Socialist Fatherland" without the successful execution of the Bolshevik "task of educating them."¹⁷

The vast majority of the masses are still destined to their lot, and only a comparatively few select individuals rise as high as the Bolshevik Party. Stalin in a *Pravda* editorial said that "it is not given to everyone to weather the trials and storms connected with membership in such a Party."¹⁸ Thus, the editorial continues, Bolsheviks who take a supercilious or bureaucratic attitude toward the masses are unworthy of Party membership and are subject to purge.¹⁹ From this separateness and the temptation of officials to become bureaucratic and useless among the masses, the need for emphasizing the linking characteristic of intelligentsia was early realized. The preparation of an intelligentsia of select worker-peasant youth was a "means of assuring a living tie between the administration and the

¹³Protsko, "Intelligentsiya . . .," *Bolshevik*, 6, March 30, 1949, p. 9.

¹⁴Titarenko, *Sovetskii* . . . , p. 52.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁶V. Khramov, *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo i raskhody sovetskogo gosudarstva*, Moscow, 1925, p. 116; Titarenko, *Sovetskii* . . . , p. 59.

¹⁷Gak, "Voprosy . . .," *Bolshevik*, 9, May 15, 1948, p. 25.

¹⁸"Pravdivost' i chestnost'," *Pravda*, February 27, 1937, p. 1.

¹⁹*Idem.*

people," and meeting the "great danger of being cut off from the masses."²⁰

The functional significance of the intelligentsia analyzed in the Molotov report now becomes clearer. Whereas the rôle of the Bolshevik Party is policy formulation and direction, the rôle of intelligentsia in the usual Soviet sense of the word is clearly executory and intermediary in the political and social framework of the Soviet state. At the apex is the Bolshevik Party, an especially destined upper intelligentsia to whom an intermediate link of intelligentsia is responsible for the actual work of moulding the masses or non-intelligentsia, the lowest stratum in the pyramid of Soviet society.

Comprising about 14 percent of the Soviet population in 1939, the intelligentsia receive specific, separate attention in most Soviet references.²¹ Its duty is to exercise the leadership of the Party over the masses and educate and inform the masses for the Party.²² Whatever their profession or occupation, they have the sole function of being specifically defined channels between Party and masses and, together with "leading workers and peasants," they are "conveyors of its line to the masses."²³

With responsibility delegated from top down through functional and geographic administrative bodies, the administrative, clerical, financial, and statistical duties of intelligentsia throughout the hierarchy of industrial and agricultural five-year planning are apparent. But, as is known, the planning has been much more than economic. It has outlined programs for all persons engaged in intellectual endeavor—for scholars and educators, scientists and technologists, writers and artists, who, because of their common executory rôle and intermediary position, have come to share the title of "intelligentsia" with military personnel and technicians, with agricultural foremen and railway station operators, with book-keepers and nurses, with recreation workers and athletes.²⁴

²⁰A. V. Lunacharsky, *Tretii front*, Moscow, 1924, p. 13.

²¹Protsko, "Intelligentsiya . . .," *Bolshevik*, 6, March 20, 1949, pp. 9-12. Even in discussions of close moral-political unity and equality in Soviet society, the intelligentsia remain the most advanced stratum of society, with a distinct rôle of authority to play. See Molotov, "28-aya godovshchina Velikoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii," *Partiinoe stroitelstvo*, 21-2, November, 1945, 9; G. Vasetsky, "Razvitie moralnopoliticheskogo edinstva sovetского obshchestva," *Bolshevik*, 9, May, 1947, p. 18.

²²S. Zhudin, "Politika partii—zhiznennaya osnova sovetского stroya," *Bolshevik*, 20, November, 1949, p. 36.

²³"Rezoliutsiya XVIII s'ezda," *Pravda*, March 22, 1939, p. 2.

²⁴The broad scope of the word "intelligentsia," already apparent from Molotov's

The Soviet system of Party-link-masses is accompanied by widely professed principles of socialist discipline and obligation enforced by an intricate procedure of control, inspection, and reports without which the five-year plans would have been mere blueprints. The plans progressed only because "the national economic plan of the USSR is an irrevocable law of the Soviet state," because all plan assignments to the various enterprises are mandatory, and non-fulfillment of these assignments is regarded as a serious and criminal infraction of state discipline by intelligentsia.²⁵

The organizational framework behind socialist discipline is of a very militant nature. The use of cadres—defined as especially trained and reliable intelligentsia commissioned to pervade all branches of Soviet society and instil patriotism and devotion to duty—was of military origin. The differentiation of command, administrative, and technical duties in the utilization of these cadres led Lenin to adopt them as the model for the entire state and society.²⁶ Every citizen in the Soviet Union who would hold a place among the intelligentsia must function within this framework. If he deceives or rejects its Party dictates, hesitates in executing them, or is a "chatterbox," he will be removed and replaced.²⁷

All intelligentsia—on the collective farms, in the trade unions and cooperatives, in all economic, governmental, cultural, and military organizations—must supplement or combine their specifically planned professional or occupational rôles with ideological and propagandist activity.²⁸ This duty has been called the "gigantic organ of propaganda for formulating scientific and artistic values," a "mighty lever" with a dual function: the raising of the popular masses to a new level and the reforming of those who consider themselves educated.²⁹ As "militant Bolshevism," it is the cornerstone of all scientific and literary endeavor, and of all philosophical dis-

analysis, is further treated in S. M. Kovalev, *Intelligentsiya v sovetskom gosudarstve*, Moscow, 1946; in Protsko, "Intelligentsiya . . .," *Bolshevik*, 6, March 30, 1949, pp. 9-22; and in numerous "intelligentsia" references to specific professional and occupational rôles in almost any specialized Soviet periodical.

²⁵S. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, *Administrativnoe pravo SSSR*, Moscow, 1946, pp. 18-9.

²⁶V. I. Lenin, "Krakh II ogointernatsionala," *Sochineniya*, Moscow, XVIII, 276.

²⁷Stalin, "Otchetnyi . . ." *Voprosy*, p. 593.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 597.

²⁹Lunacharsky, *Chto takoe obrazovanie*, Gomel, 1919, p. 17.

cussion.³⁰ Numerous references to this Bolshevik use of intellectual activity may be cited but a few will suffice for illustration.

Scientists and scholars serve as an ideological link between Party and masses by running for election to the Supreme Soviet and proclaiming the goal of Soviet science to serve the state exclusively and emulate and surpass the rest of the world.³¹ The physician and teacher combine rôles in industrial enterprises and collective farms and in "ped-propaganda" among parents, to shape public opinion and make the masses conscious of building socialism.³² Teachers are urged to appear at campaign centers, meetings, and clubs in the "esteemed rôle of a Bolshevik agitator and propagandist."³³ Librarians pivot all cultural and communications media for the "ideological front."³⁴ Technical specialists in industry and agriculture must be ideologically indoctrinated as government agitators,³⁵ and some intelligentsia in transportation, government, and the armed forces must attend periodic refresher courses and be Party members in order to insure their consistent and correct ideological functioning.³⁶ Party organizations and their leaders are constantly enjoined by decrees of the Central Committee to pay increasing attention to the political education of intelligentsia "in the mastery of Bolshevism and the spirit of Marxism-Leninism," lest some find themselves in the "camp of the enemies of socialism" through neglect of their ideological rôle.³⁷

A standard textbook in indoctrinating intelligentsia, called Stalin's "brilliant scientific work," *Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)*,³⁸ is said to help them "to join the ideological treasure house of Marxism-Leninism, by illuminating the path to cadres of Party and government in their practical

³⁰A. M. Egorin, *Itogi fil'sofskoi diskussii i zadachi literaturovedeniya*, Moscow, 1948, p. 20.

³¹S. I. Vavilov, *Sovetskaya nauka na novom etape*, Moscow, 1946, pp. 101-3.

³²P. Orlov, "Pedpropaganda," *Vestnik prosveshchenie*, 8-9, Aug.-Sept., 1929, pp. 153-7, *passim*.

³³"Agitatsionno-propagandistskaya rabota uchitelya," *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, December 19, 1945, p. 1.

³⁴"Aboniment—vazhneishii uchastok bibliotechnoi raboty," *Bibliotekar*, 2, February, 1947, p. 1.

³⁵"Zadachi podgotovki selskokhozyaistvennykh spetsialistov," *Sovkhoznoe proizvodstvo*, 10, October, 1945, pp. 1-3.

³⁶VKP(B), *Ustav*, Moscow, 1946, secs. 68-9.

³⁷F. Konstantinov, *Rol idei v obshchestvennom razvitii*, Moscow, 1940, p. 41; "Ibeino-politicheskoe vospitanie intelligentsii," *Pravda*, June 5, 1947, p. 3.

³⁸VKP(B), *Istoriya, kratkii kurs*, Moscow, 1938.

work."³⁹ In the thirties, before any Anglo-American intelligentsia could be admitted into the fold of the new Soviet intelligentsia, it was considered necessary to "liberate them from the traditional spiderweb still confusing their ideas." Then it was required that their "thoughts be fully directed into the deep Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist channel."⁴⁰

Soviet intelligentsia, it is maintained in the Soviet state, will successfully fulfill their political and executory function and solve their historical task only by thoroughly saturating themselves with "the naturally only correct science of society—Marxism-Leninism," and by being enthusiastically interested in the destiny of the country.⁴¹ The zealous desire and preparation to devote their very lives to proletarian socialism, to the "Soviet motherland and its people," is, according to a *Pravda* editorial, "the most precious characteristic" of intelligentsia in the Soviet Union.⁴²

Classics of Marxism, say the Soviets, point out that Communism will mean complete destruction of "the old professions which chained man all his life." The division of labor into intellectual and non-intellectual, into skilled and unskilled, they predict, will completely disappear,⁴³ and society organized on Communist foundations will make it possible for its members to have a multi-sided development of their abilities. The Soviet theoreticians state that in time they will educate all workers and peasants to Bolshevik ways and "when all society becomes educated, the intelligentsia will cease its existence."⁴⁴ The present use of the term "intelligentsia" will become obsolete since, the Soviet writers add, then only will the differentiation be completely removed and "there will not be an intelligentsia even as a special social stratum."⁴⁵

The use of the term "intelligentsia" in the Soviet Union contrasts sharply with its more usual application to those engaged in intellectual, critical, or creative activities. Already under the needs of

³⁹Protsko, "Intelligentsiya . . .," *Bolshevik*, 6, March 30, 1949, p. 9.

⁴⁰I. Gekker, "Sredi Anglo-Amerikanskoi intelligentsii," *Front nauki i tekhniki*, 8 (1936), p. 101.

⁴¹Stalin, "Ochetnyi . . .," *Voprosy*, p. 599.

⁴²"Nasha intelligentsiya," *Pravda*, June 18, 1936, p. 1.

⁴³N. Bobrovnikov, "Marks ob unichtozhenii protivopolozhnosti mezhdum umstvennym i fizicheskim trudom," *Pod znamenem Marksizma*, 2, March-April, 1933, p. 212.

⁴⁴M. A. Reisner, "Intelligentsiya kak predmet izucheniya v plane nauchnoi raboty," *Pechat i revoliutsiya*, 1, Jan.-March, 1922, p. 101.

⁴⁵"Intelligentsiya," *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, XXVIII, 619.

state plans prior to World War II, the term began to embrace all fields of mental and skilled activity necessary to the plans and to exclude all other intellectual endeavor. As the intermediaries between the ruling Bolshevik Party and the masses, members of the Soviet intelligentsia are rigidly restricted to the execution of state plans. In short, their rôle is political and executory before it is intellectual. They are considered "new Soviet intelligentsia" only as they are zealously devoted to "Bolshevik principles of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism" and the "Bolshevik spirit of socialist discipline and obligation."

In accordance with over-all Soviet theory relating to the "temporary and transitional" socialist phase of the strong state, the executory rôle of intelligentsia in the Soviet state is supposed to be temporary and eventually wither away. Thus the Bolshevik definition of intelligentsia in the Soviet state is allied to the utopianism of Communist economics and the classless society.

Reflections on the Origins and Meaning of the Russian Revolution

BY N. O. LOSSKY

IN 1917 a revolution started in Russia, one unparalleled in the history of mankind in its destructiveness, cruelty, abundance of victims, and duration. People not living in Russia up to 1917, and therefore lacking a concrete idea of Russian culture at that time, usually imagine that the imperial régime was barbarous and cruel, cramping the freedom of all citizens in every respect, and creating unbearable conditions of life for workers and peasants. Such a régime, they think, inevitably had to lead to a violent revolution. The purpose of this article is to show that such ideas are erroneous, and that the Revolution of 1917 was the result of an unfortunate confluence of circumstances, and not at all the inner necessity of the Russian historical process.

There were many inner difficulties and shortcomings in the Russian government and society, but those which might have become reasons for a revolution were gradually being overcome by the natural process of development, and if it had not been for World War I, the revolution in Russia would not have occurred.

Let us start with the question of the economic life of Russia. Count V. N. Kokovtsov (long-time Minister of Finance, and in 1911-14 Chairman of the Council of Ministers) writes in his book *Out of My Past* of the uninterrupted and significant accumulation of national wealth in all forms during the decade 1904-13. Let us take from this book only the statistics about the growth of capital in the State Savings Banks, where small depositors brought in their savings. "Early in the year 1904, the money and securities deposited in them amounted to 1,022,000,000 rubles; in 1913, the amount was 2,100,000,000—it had more than doubled. The number of savings books had increased from 4,854,000 to 8,597,000." Kokovtsov writes further that "under the influence of the Agrarian Reform, aimed at the development and growth of small peasant properties, and of the measures designed to improve and intensify agricultural production, to increase the demand for agricultural machinery and chemical fertilizers, to spread agricultural education . . . the

Russian peasantry was becoming stronger. Good crops were becoming more regular and the productivity of the cultivated land was increasing." The growth of industry was extremely swift; it could be envisaged that within several decades Russia would catch up with the United States.

The legal and economic situation of the peasants was highly abnormal. In most of the provinces communal land-tenure was practiced. Land was owned by the village commune but was divided into lots which were given for the use of individual families who worked them separately. Periodically the land was reallocated, and the family which had raised the crop yield of its land through the proper cultivation of it, was deprived of this allotment. In this way, the commune hampered the transition to improved, intensive agriculture, and the peasants always lacked land as a result of this extensive economy. Their perennial craving for the increase of their land holdings upheld in them the conviction that justice demanded that the land be taken away from the landowners and given to them, who worked on the soil.

The situation of the peasantry began to undergo a profound change, when in 1906 Stolypin introduced a law giving peasants the opportunity of leaving the commune, receiving from it a piece of land in individual possession, and establishing a firm farmstead economy on it. At the same time the transfer of privately-owned lands into the hands of the peasants was greatly speeded up by means of purchases with the assistance of the Peasants Bank. Through these measures a large class of petty landholders would soon have appeared in Russia, making a revolution impossible.

The legal situation of the peasants was also abnormal. After the abolition of serfdom the peasant, as Witte wrote in his *Memoirs*, "ceased to be the serf of the landowner, but became the serf of the village commune, constantly under the watchful eye of the Land Captain." Through the efforts of the Duma this abnormal situation was about to be remedied, and the Third Duma had already taken up the business of improving the position of the peasants.

Besides the economic conditions, one of the wellsprings of revolutionary ferment in Russia was the battle against autocracy. This source of revolutionary sentiment was also very much weakened by the manifesto of October 17, 1905. Although the First Duma was unable to work with the government because of the extreme political inexperience of Russian intelligentsia, the Second Duma, says Maklakov in his book about it, and similarly the Third and

Fourth Dumas, gradually acquired the means of working together with the government. In the field of national defense, on the eve of World War I, and on the question of raising the level of public education, this cooperation was especially fruitful. According to the provisions of the law worked out by the Duma and the State Council, from 1913 on, the Ministry of Education ~~was to receive~~ an annual budget raise of ten million rubles specifically for primary education. By 1922, this sum would have amounted to a hundred million rubles, and the network of public schools would have been sufficient for universal education. This growth of the educational system was an organic one. It consisted not only in the construction of new schools, but also in the founding of new teachers' colleges and new universities. The schools were provided with books and other supplies largely through the efforts of the Zemstvos, which dedicated themselves to this work with enthusiasm. All this successful work of the government in cooperation with the public was cut off by the Bolshevik Revolution. The Bolsheviks compliment themselves that they brought universal education, but they brought it ten years later than it would have appeared without a revolution; besides, they sharply lowered the level of teacher education and to this day are unable to provide all the schools with textbooks and other school equipment.

The battle between the Duma and the old autocratic régime, which feared any extension of the Duma's rights, paralleled something that had happened in the history of all Western European countries. The broadening of civil rights and popular representation is always accomplished in the process of a stubborn struggle with the old régime, which mistrusts the new order until its safety and usefulness is demonstrated in practice. In Russia this process, on the eve of the war, took such a form that one could hope for the working out of a democratic, constitutional monarchy. V. Maklakov in his book, *The State and Society in Old Russia*, says: "At that time there were in Russia two forces: One was the historical authority with a great reserve of knowledge and experience, but which could not rule alone and another, the educated public, much of it with good understanding and full of good intentions, but by itself incapable of ruling anything. Russia's salvation lay in the reconciliation and union of these two forces, in their combined and coordinated work. . . . The constitutional régime was educating both the state authority and the public itself. . . ."

At the outset of World War I, the main causes of revolutionary

ferment were set aside: the economic position of Russia was quickly improving, the process of bringing the peasants up to the level of the other classes of society was underway, and autocracy was limited. Nevertheless, in February, 1917, a revolution occurred. How could this happen? The revolutionary, N. Sukhanov, who carefully observed all the phases of this process, wrote in his *Notes on the Revolution*: "The Revolution broke out as a direct reaction to the unheard-of severity of the war." Indeed, the February revolution occurred spontaneously, not according to a plan worked out by any group of revolutionaries, and without a conquest of power by any specific party. The extremely debilitating war, the senseless behavior of the government, the appointment by the Tsar of unpopular ministers, the compromising of the Tsar's family by Rasputin, the conscription of fifteen million men, and the filling of the army with reserves of the older age groups—all these widened again the gap between the government, the people, and the Duma. In the light of all this, one can understand how two regiments stationed in St. Petersburg went marching to the support of the Duma, which had just been dissolved by the government. The Duma, realizing that the government was incapable of putting down the insurrection, did not submit to the decree of dismissal, and formed a temporary committee "for the establishment of order in the land."

One can be certain that if it had not been for the exhausting war, the gap between the government and the people of Russia would not have opened up again, and the revolution would not have occurred. The imperial régime fell in February, 1917, directly as a result of the war and the suicidal actions of the government. Lenin managed in October to achieve a second revolution, directed against the bourgeoisie and landowners. He achieved his goal through unscrupulous demagoguery, promising that with the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, an immediate peace would be secured, all private, crown, and church estates would be confiscated and handed over to peasant committees, and workers would gain control over the industry. Having enticed the soldiers, peasants, and workers, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional government. Through systematic terror and an all-pervasive secret police system, they created such an omnipotent dictatorship that it gave Stalin the opportunity to bring about, in 1929, a third revolution, the cruelest and bloodiest of all, directed against the last class of property owners—the peasants. Having forced the peasants to become laborers on the collective and state

farms, the government of the Soviet Union had concentrated all economic, military, and police power in its hands. It started to exploit the whole population to an extent which would be impossible in any capitalistic country. The people, who had been deceived by demagoguery, received none of the promised blessings. Instead of peace, there followed a civil war; the peasants became serfs once again, receiving extremely scanty recompense for their labor; the workers found themselves tied to their factories, and received less pay than before for longer and more arduous work. Under the totalitarian Soviet régime the population was not only deprived of political liberty, but of all civil liberties as well. Instead of an abundance of material wealth came extreme poverty, because the unscrupulous government used the labor of the people for the creation of a grandiose military machine and for the organization of fifth columns all over the world, rather than for the satisfaction of the people's needs.

The cruelty of the Soviet régime is truly of a satanic character. It destroys the will of an individual not only through physical tortures, but through moral tortures as well, of which the most horrifying is the device of torturing children before the eyes of their parents. Information about how Cardinal Mindzenty was brought to make a "confession" about acts he never committed shows that the security police has found drugs which affect the nerve centers and paralyze the person's will. Not a human, but a satanic mind invented this method of degrading a human being.

The sufferings of the Russian people brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution have lasted now for more than thirty years. Hence, in the mind of a religious person, who acknowledges the existence of a Divine Providence, and who believes that every event has some positive meaning, arises the question: why did God allow such an evil to happen, and why does He tolerate it so long? Historians may supply a more or less exact answer to this question in a hundred years or so, but even in our time it is possible to make some conjectures on this question.

The economic and social development of the twentieth century has put mankind squarely before the difficult problem of working out a system guaranteeing a greater measure of social justice. For a long time moralists, Vladimir Soloviev for example, have been saying that material means, absolutely essential to spiritual development and befitting the dignity of human life, must be guaranteed to every individual. The majority of influential property owners

have been deaf to this sermon. They sneeringly label any system which gives help to the economically weaker strata of society as a "welfare state." In 1949 a book by John Flynn, *The Road Ahead to Socialism*, was published in the United States and widely distributed for propaganda. The author of this book subtly suggests to the reader that social reforms such as medical insurance, low-cost housing, etc., will inevitably lead to socialism; that is, to the nationalization of the means of production, with a resulting loss of economic and other freedoms. The groundlessness of Flynn's reasoning can be shown up by the following analogy. Let us suppose that someone interested in natural methods of medical treatment every day does light gymnastics, takes short walks, enjoys fresh air, etc., and then without consulting a doctor takes a prolonged sun bath and dies of sunstroke. Natural methods of maintaining one's health are not in the least responsible for this sad demise: gymnastics, walks, and the like, do not obligate every one who uses them to go to such a severe extreme as a sun bath.

Flynn's book, despite its logical incoherence, will have a great success among the propertied classes. It supplies them with arguments against social reform, at the same time giving them the appearance of fighting for the great blessing—Freedom, rather than for their own selfish interests. The only thing that can break down the egotism of these people is the fear of a revolution, and the Soviet Union is a bugbear inculcating such a fear. The Soviet government is gathering enormous military might with the aim of subjugating the whole world, not to speak of its fifth columns in every country. The fear of this danger which hangs over the world has already served in many countries as the impetus to social reform, and to the freeing of many colonial peoples, and it has intensified the search for new paths in social and political life.

For more than a hundred years many European intellectuals, including Russians, believed devoutly that socialism was the only means of realizing social justice. In the minds of many people today, socialism as means has turned into socialism as an end in itself. The example of the Soviet Union serves as a graphic demonstration of the fact that the mere change of ownership does not in itself solve the problem: the state, having become the sole proprietor, can exploit the proletariat to an even greater degree than can private capitalists. We can only hope that the trend towards socialism will now weaken and, at any rate, that no one will now strive towards complete socialization. It is clear that social justice can be attained not

only through the course of changing the hands of ownership, but through divers other ways, such as social insurance (the Beveridge Plan), legislative control of industry, and so on.

In our time, the danger of the exploitation of labor by capital has greatly diminished, thanks to the growing strength of the labor unions. The recent strikes in the steel and coal industries of the U.S.A. showed that the labor unions command more strength than the capitalist-millionaires. Soon may arise the problem of how to protect society from the misuse by labor of the powers of its unions. Only unscrupulous Soviet propagandists and their fellow-travellers can today speak of the capitalist monopolies in modern democracies.

Besides the question of a new economic system, mankind is faced with one other monumental problem—the forming of a supranational union of peoples. To overcome governmental egoism, which demands absolute national sovereignty, is much more difficult than conquering the egoism of single individuals. There are two possible ways of achieving this goal. By far the simplest, and the relatively easier way, is to unite mankind through armed force. The Soviet Union is setting itself this task. The other way of uniting mankind is a noble but extremely difficult job: to found a supranational organization through the free agreement of independent states. Unfortunately, disinterested aspiration for peace and international cooperation is a theme but weakly felt by most people. Much more powerfully works the fear of completely losing one's liberty. The military might of the Soviet Union impresses this fear, and stimulates mankind to speed up the organization of a supranational body through the course of free agreement. In this manner, Providence puts the evil of the Russian Revolution to good use.

However good for mankind the consequences of the Russian Revolution may be, this good is achieved through the immeasurable suffering of the Russian people, and, therefore, for us Russians arises the tormenting question: why is it Russia that has to serve as the guinea pig for social experiments and as a bugbear for other countries? There is an external reason why Russia had to be the victim of a historical process. Only such an enormous country, commanding one-sixth of the globe, with the greatest variety of natural wealth, could survive over several decades the killing experiment of total socialism, and give a lesson on the unattainability of this utopia. Besides this external reason for Russia's fate, there must exist an inner one, springing from the very nature of the Russian people. On this score one can only make guesses, based on a many-sided in-

vestigation of the character of the Russian people and of Russian history. After such an effort to understand the Providential meaning in the sufferings of the Russian people, one still would have to add to his conjectures: inscrutable are the ways of the Lord.

Without doubt, heavy were the sins of the Russian people which evoked the doleful fate of our compatriots in the USSR, and of us, living in emigration. We must hope, however, that these sins have been redeemed through long suffering and that the hour of Russia's liberation from its godless and inhuman rulers is drawing near. If this liberation takes place through war rather than through internal upheaval, then the fate of Russia will depend on the Allied Democracies who defeat the Soviet power. If the victors identify the Russian people with the Soviet government, then they will fear Russia as a great power, as an incorrigible aggressor. In this case they will try to divide Russia into several independent political units, thus increasing the world's number of quarreling national states. Such a mistake would prove especially advantageous to the German Nazis, who dream of a *revanche*.

He who knows the character of the Russian people knows that they are the helpless victims of Marxist fanatics, rather than the instigators of Communist despotism. By nature, the Russian people are inclined towards a democratic system. The whole intellectual and cultural history of Russian society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnesses to that. Besides this, Russians belong to the ranks of the most peaceloving peoples. A considerable part of the vast Russian territory was acquired through peaceful colonization rather than by force. When the Russian people manage to found a democratic order, then—and then only—Russia will become a member of the family of nations, able to guarantee peace, social justice, and general welfare.

Ezhov's Régime*

BY R. V. IVANOV-RAZUMNIK

I

IT should be kept in mind that the incidents recorded below all happened during the grim period when Ezhov—a mentally unbalanced man and possibly an *agent provocateur*—headed the NKVD. Under him, a wave of arrests swept the country; their number went into the hundreds of thousands and the millions; the prisons in Moscow and the provinces were filled to overflowing; emergency barracks to receive the ever growing droves of new prisoners were being hastily erected all over the country (to my personal knowledge—at Cheliabinsk, at Sverdlovsk). This was real “wrecking,” evil and vile beyond words; and the sufferings of millions of innocent people cannot be justified by any reasons of state. The degenerate Ezhov was lustily assisted by the loathsome Zakovsky who, in 1937, won questionable fame with his utterly fantastic pamphlet about espionage—and a year later was himself arrested and executed as a spy. . . . It would be interesting to know whether history some day will uncover the real background of the unbelievable infamies committed during those two years—1937 and 1938—or the true culprits will be able to cover up their traces and to shift the blame to subordinates?

Be that as it may, I was engulfed in the wave of the September mass arrests and was well aware that this time it was in earnest and for long. . . . I proved right: I spent 21 months in prison.

It was late in October of 1937. Still a “greenhorn,” after only one month at the Butyrki prison, I used to sleep in the so-called “sub-way,” the space under the bunks (spending the nights not so much sleeping as gasping for breath, since the air under the bunks, to one still unaccustomed to it, was stifling). We were just getting ready for the night; it was rather warm outside and the “*framoooga*” (upper part of the window) was open. All of a sudden a hush fell on the

*This is a translation of an excerpt from the author's unpublished reminiscences *Tiurny i ssylki* (Prisons and Deportations), written in Germany in 1944-45. This excerpt was published in a New York Russian-language periodical, *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik* (The Socialist Courier), in September, 1949 [Ed.].

ward; everybody listened intently: from somewhere through the window came stifled screams:

"Comrades, comrades, help! You devils, what are you doing to me? Comrades, murder, help!"

And after a brief silence, a long inarticulate wail:

"Oh-oh-oh!"

Again a moment of sinister silence—and then renewed frantic screams.

"Help, help, they're killing me!"

This went on for several minutes, but to us it seemed like ages. . . .

Professor Kalmanson, our ward-monitor, was the first to recover his wits; he jumped down from his bunk, seized a heavy stool and began furiously battering the heavy metal door. All the prisoners were yelling, the adjoining wards were also storming; guards from the whole length of the corridor came running. They tried to reassure us, pretending that the screams we had heard had come from the "mental" ward. By now all was quiet. In silence we went back to our bunks, but hardly anyone was able to sleep that night.

We were only too well aware that the matter had nothing to do with the mental ward and that we had witnessed—not *oculis sed auribus*—a "questioning" by an examining magistrate. I wish to note here that such a thing happened only once: the magistrate was doubtlessly reprimanded for his "inept conduct of the examination" (the fool had forgotten to shut the "framooga"!) and the ensuing riot among the prisoners. After this, the beatings in the examination rooms were administered with the windows tightly shut.

Long before being arrested, we had heard rumors about beatings and even torture in the prisons; now for the first time we had listened with our own ears to the agonized wails of a victim. . . . The examination rooms were located on the third floor, right above us, and the screams had reached us through the open window of one of these rooms.

There can be no doubt that some kinds of torture had been practised before Ezhov's time by the G.P.U., but probably as an exception—apart from the notorious "stewing chambers" of the mid-twenties where arrested bourgeois were "steamed" until they were ready to surrender any gold and dollars in their possession. It was also in the twenties that the poet Nikolay Kluev happened to spend three days and nights at the "cork room" of the G.P.U., and related his experience with horror; it is a fact that such a room actually existed, and it must have been established with some definite pur-

pose. . . . Until now, however, all the rumors and reports of torture in the prisons had been to us a matter of hearsay. Now we were destined to become witnesses and often victims of an undisguised system of torture applied by Ezhov's staff of examiners by order of their chief.

Yet, I must emphasize that I have never observed any torture in the literal medieval sense; what I saw and heard was mostly "plain beating-up." But is there really a clear demarcation line between beating-up and torture? If a man is beaten with rubber clubs for three hours (with brief interruptions) and is brought back to the ward unconscious; if after this for a whole week he discharges blood instead of urine—has he been tortured or not? If a prisoner's ribs have been broken and he has to be carried straight from the examination room to the infirmary—has he undergone torture or not? If as a result of the beating a man's spine is so badly injured that he is unable to walk—may we not call this torture? What if both his legs have been broken and he returns to the ward weeks later on crutches? And what about the "conveyor" (running belt) interrogations—when the prisoner is prevented from sleeping for seven consecutive nights? Is that torture? Why, no one has so much as touched him! And there are many subtler methods of "moral pressure": the man is knocked down and his face is pressed into a spittoon overflowing with spittle; or else the examining magistrate makes him open his mouth wide and spits into it; or he makes the prisoner kneel before him and then urinates upon his head.

Of all these incidents I know from personal observation. But I shall not argue about words; I readily admit that there was no crude medieval torture of screw and rack; I never saw any instruments of torture either at Lubianka or Butyrki (although the Lefortovo prison was said to make use of some). I must insist, however, that the various methods of inflicting moral and physical pain and degradation which I have witnessed had the same purpose as regular torture: to make those subjected to them confess to crimes of which they are innocent. The medieval witch was made to put her feet into "Spanish boots" stuck inside with nails, and when these were made red-hot, the witch would confess and then would be burnt at the stake. The "spy" or "wrecker" of our own days is beaten with clubs, not allowed to sleep, submitted to unspeakable indignities—until at last he breaks down and pleads guilty, to be either shot or deported to a forced labor camp. Is there really such a great difference?

I repeat: the incidents mentioned above are not a matter of hearsay but the records of an eyewitness. I shall describe here only a few—the most typical among the two or three score I have observed. I do not always remember the names of the victims, since I knew them usually under their ward nicknames; but this is irrelevant to the facts.

One day in the hot summer of 1938, the door of our ward No. 79 swung open and the guard let in a new prisoner, a middle-aged man in a military tunic, walking on crutches. He said:

"Allow me to introduce myself, comrades: Harmonist!"

I wondered at the queer name. As it turned out, it was not his name but his profession: he had played the accordion (*harmonica*, in Russian) in the famous "Red Army Song and Dance Chorus." To us every newcomer was a living newspaper and we eagerly surrounded him; but we learned no political news from him: he had come to us not from the world outside but from a long round of prisons. Nevertheless, we listened with interest to his odyssey. "The Harmonist" became his ward nickname.

He had been a famous accordion-virtuoso, the first among the six "harmonists" of the "Red Army Chorus." In the summer of 1937, this chorus had made a triumphant appearance in Paris, at the World Exhibition. Upon its return, a part of its members, among them our Harmonist, went on tour throughout Siberia. At Khabarovsk, he had the bad luck to quarrel with the agent of the NKVD attached to the chorus; they came to blows. The next day the Harmonist was arrested, and for six months underwent "questioning" at the torture chamber of the Khabarovsk secret police. He had to be charged with some crime, of course; but in this respect NKVD officials are never at a loss (there was a saying in prison: "where there is a man, there's some charge to be pinned on him"). The charge they pinned on the Harmonist was based on a clause of the notorious law No. 58: he was accused of "individual terrorism." For several years, in the thirties, he had lived in Moscow; and during that period, so he told us, he would be frequently summoned to the Kremlin to entertain at parties given by top-rank Communist bosses: the musical tastes of the Kremlin great were on a level that made them delight in accordion virtuosity. During the last two years before his arrest, the Harmonist had been called to regale the masters of the Kremlin no less than sixty times. "Late in the evening, sometimes in the middle of the night, they would send a car

for me; I would be taken to some intimate party given most often by Klim Voroshilov, but sometimes by Stalin himself; I would play for them and then have supper with them—at the same table with the host and the guests. . . .”

And now the Khabarovsk NKVD used these gay Kremlin parties against him. He was accused of terroristic designs: allegedly he had always attended these gatherings with a gun in his pocket and only the lack of courage had prevented him from attempting assassination (his courage had failed him some sixty times!). To make the Harmonist confess to the crime he was supposed to have planned but not committed, the usual persuasive arguments, such as rubber clubs, were used; but the Harmonist was recalcitrant and did not confess. He was ruthlessly beaten; in the course of one of these “examinations” both his legs were broken beneath the knee and he was carried unconscious to the infirmary which he left weeks later on crutches. Then they transferred him from prison to prison until at last he reached Butyrki in Moscow—still without having confessed. And so now he was with us in our ward. Day after day, he would tirelessly write petitions addressed to Voroshilov, firmly convinced that “Klim” wouldn’t let him down and would come to his rescue. With the same result he might have addressed his epistles to the moon; they certainly went no farther than the examiner’s wastebasket. Some three months later, I was taken away from that ward and do not know what happened next to our Harmonist.

Those beatings had taken place in faraway Khabarovsk; but we had plenty of opportunity to observe the same methods of “questioning” in our immediate proximity.

In April, 1938, I was taken for questioning from Butyrki to the Lubyanka prison where I spent a week in the overcrowded so-called “kennel.” The place next to me on the bare stone floor was occupied by an elderly man of Russian-German extraction,—a Communist, the red director of the trust “Down and Feathers.”

He was held on the charge of “spying and wrecking” and taken daily from the “kennel” to the examination room. Sometimes he would come back on his legs, but often on a stretcher,—there had been no torture, of course, just a “plain beating-up”! The heat and overcrowding in the “kennel” were terrific; we used to lie on the floor in our undershirts; and once, lying back to back with poor “Down and Feathers,” I felt my shirt getting sticky—not with sweat, as I thought at first, but with the blood dripping from his welt-covered back. . . . Together we were brought back “home,”

to Butyrki; they put us in a new ward, No. 79, from where he went straight to the infirmary. After three weeks he reappeared in the ward, a ghost of his former self; he walked with difficulty, spit blood; his broken ribs had not yet knit. He had to be taken back to the infirmary; and soon we learned through the prison grapevine of his death.

Another inmate of ward 79, Sabelfeld, a Volga German, a former major of the NKVD troops, suffered a similar treatment at the Butyrki prison itself (after all, why go to the trouble of sending prisoners elsewhere for "questioning"?). Not so long ago he had wielded the whip himself; now his own body had to take the punishment. . . . He was charged with spying in favor of Germany. After every "questioning" he would come back to the ward badly beaten, even with traces of the examination methods on his face,—black eyes, swellings, scratched cheeks (which was rare, since the examiners usually preferred to work upon less conspicuous parts of the body). He stood it for a long time without confessing; at last, driven to despair, he decided to go on a hunger strike. He fasted for ten days, which was not easy in the crowded place, with everybody else eating before his eyes. Then he was summoned to the examining magistrate:

"So you think you'll scare us with your hunger strike! You're wrong there, we're not so easily scared! Starve to death, we don't care! And now open your mouth!"

And he richly expectorated into Sabelfeld's mouth:

"Here's nourishment for you!"

Back in the ward, Sabelfeld decided to kill himself. That day, when most prisoners were out for their daily exercise hour and he and I were almost alone in the ward, he confided to me in a whisper that he had just "committed suicide," swallowing a bit of glass he had picked up in the prison yard the day before during the airing. Whereupon I told him the story of a friend of mine, a writer, who had attempted suicide in a Tiflis prison by swallowing the crushed fragments of an electric bulb—and yet had survived. I advised Sabelfeld to stop thinking of suicide and to put an end to his hunger strike—which he did. Soon he was taken away "with belongings" and disappeared from our horizon.

Apart from the Sabelfeld case, I know of two other attempts of suicide in my wards, both unsuccessful. In the beginning of 1938, in ward 45, during our evening tea, the comparative quiet of the ward was suddenly disturbed by strange moans and groans coming from

the "subway." We rushed in the direction of the noise—and dragged out the half-dead body of the instructor of our bookkeeping group. Driven to despair by the examinations, he had invented an original method of strangling himself: he rolled a handkerchief into a twist, tied it around his neck, pushed a wooden spoon between his neck and the twist at the back of his head and started revolving it, thus pulling the twist tighter and tighter. Had we not heard his groans, he might have carried out his purpose.

The other case happened in ward 79, about six months later. In August I was summoned for questioning, and was puzzled by the unfamiliar methods used that day by my convoy. Usually a single guard would come for me from the examiners' floor, would call out my name and then let me walk ahead of him. This time three "archangels" turned up; two of them firmly gripped my arms and dragged me along, while the third brought up the rear. Back at the ward, I told the others of this amazing procedure; but from that day on, all prisoners were taken for examination with the same ceremonial. On that very day, a fellow-prisoner, Colonel Liamin, who for some time had been murderously beaten at every questioning, failed to return to the ward. We never saw him again, but we learned through the grapevine what had happened to him. The guard was leading him down one flight of stairs to the examiners' floor. As in all prisons, the staircases in Butyrki are enclosed with wirenets to prevent the prisoners from jumping down the well. But Colonel Liamin chose another way: he plunged down the steps head foremost and crashed his skull against the radiator on the landing. The blow, however, was not fatal, and, although taken unconscious to the infirmary, he recovered and was later transferred to another ward. That incident accounted for the new procedure and the three "archangels."

But let us go back to the maltreatment of prisoners. I have said enough about "plain beatings." There were many other more refined methods of torture.

In ward 45, the bunk next to mine was occupied by Dr. Kurtglass, an army surgeon. I am not quite sure of the name, but it could be ascertained through reference to the Moscow telephone directory for 1937,—at that time the Doctor held the position of senior Medical Officer of the Moscow military district.

He was charged with participation in the well-known conspiracy of General Toukhachevsky. Endless examinations with beatings,

insults, humiliations, had been fruitless—the Doctor stubbornly refused to “confess.” Coming back to the ward after such a “questioning,” utterly exhausted in body and mind, he would say to me: “Don’t tell me Dostoevsky knew all about cruelty! He was a babe-in-arms, your Fyodor Mikhailovich!” Soon he was to suffer an ordeal indeed worthy of Dostoevsky’s somber imagination.

At daybreak on Monday, the 3rd of December 1937, he was taken away for an examination that lasted for six hours; all this time he spent standing silently by the wall (not allowed to lean against it), while the examiner busied himself at his desk, remarking now and then:

“So you won’t confess, you scoundrel? All right, keep standing there by the wall, we’re in no hurry! We’ll make you squeal yet!”

At noon the guard led him back to the ward, warning him to be ready again in fifteen minutes; he kept watching the prisoner through the peephole. The Doctor finished his meal in a hurry and was taken away. He was back by 6 P.M. and told us that again they had kept him standing by the wall all the time; but there had been a different examiner behind the desk. This was called a “conveyer” questioning: the examiners relieved each other every six hours, day and night, while their victim was passed along this unusual “running belt.”

After a hasty supper in the ward, the Doctor spent the whole night—twelve hours—standing on his feet by the wall. Brought back next morning at six, he tried to lie down on his bunk but was immediately aroused by the special guard who was watching him through the peephole. Within a few minutes he was returned to the examination room for a continuation of his harrowing experience.

Thus Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday went by,—the Doctor standing by the wall on his feet, *without a moment of sleep*. Whenever the exhausted man would doze off or sway on his feet (since he was forbidden to lean against the wall), the examiner would spring up from his seat, pull at the Doctor’s beard and shower him with threats and abuse. On Friday morning, after four days and nights spent thus without sleep, the Doctor, brought back to the ward for his breakfast, said to me: “My wife—there’s a clever woman for you! Somehow she managed to get inside Butyrki and to sneak a pouch of tobacco into my pocket, right under the examiner’s nose! But where is it?”—and he feverishly began to search his pockets. Throughout Friday, the fifth day of the “conveyer,” he suffered from similar hallucinations; after that they stopped. A medical

man, he had found a way to counteract in some measure the effects of insomnia and to keep up his strength: every morning he would fill his pockets with lumps of sugar we collected for him, and throughout the day would surreptitiously put bit after bit into his mouth, the examiner never noticing. This kept him going.

Saturday and Sunday—December 8 and 9—passed in the same way; the Doctor stood the test with amazing fortitude and still would not confess. How long would the cruel experiment go on? On Monday, December 10, the Doctor was brought back to the ward as usual for his breakfast; how he was still able to move, to walk, to speak, passes understanding. The usual fifteen minutes were over and still no one came to fetch him, and there was no eye watching him through the peephole. Apparently, after precisely a week of cruel torture, the “conveyer” had been brought to a stop. We made the Doctor comfortable on a bunk, covered him with a furcoat, put a makeshift pillow under his head,—but he was unable to sleep. Only gradually, day by day, did he recover; and he would say again and again: “A babe-in-arms was your Dostoevsky!”

From old-timers among the prisoners we learned that the ordeal by deprivation of sleep required a special authorization by the Chief Prosecutor of the NKVD and was never extended beyond one week,—such was the law (the law, indeed!). Very few were able to withstand it; Dr. Kurtglass did. A month later he was called out “with belongings,” and we heard after a while that he had been transferred to the most dreaded of all prisons—Lefortovo.

At Lefortovo, according to many accounts, real instruments of torture—iron-toothed scrapers, thumb-screws and such—were in use; but since those who told me about it had themselves been neither objects nor eyewitnesses of that kind of torture, I shall not dwell upon this aspect. Suffice it to say that a year later, while I was held in ward 113 of Butyrki, one of the inmates of the adjoining ward was the well-known builder of the aircraft named ANT after his initials—A. N. Tupolev. He told me the following: a year before he had been arrested and brought to Lefortovo where he had to share a cell with Muklievich, a former big Party boss, who after weeks of examinations at Lefortovo had already signed a confession. Muklievich urged Tupolev to make a confession at the very first questioning and drew up a picture of the unspeakable horrors that awaited him in case of recalcitrance. The picture was apparently so convincing (Tupolev would not go into details) that the unfortunate ANT, unwilling to suffer all that had been done to Muklievich, took

the latter's advice and at the very first examination admitted everything the examiner wanted him to admit. In this way he escaped torture and was transferred to Butyrki where he now awaited the decision regarding his further fate.

I also remember a fleeting glimpse I had at the Lubianka "kennel," in November, 1937, of a bearded engineer who had just returned from an examination and was sobbing like a child: they had told him that, since he was unwilling to confess, he would be taken to Lefortovo and would have "to bear the consequences." Within a few hours he was actually taken away from the "kennel."

And so Dr. Kurtglass' fate had brought him to that gruesome Lefortovo. . . . What they did to him there, I do not know; but a year later I learned through a fellow-prisoner who had just come to Butyrki from the Lubianka prison that the Doctor was there in the common ward, that he had confessed and was expecting to be either shot or sent to a concentration camp.

(To be continued)

Boris A. Bakhmeteff

1880-1951

THE passing away of Professor Boris A. Bakhmeteff has removed from the Russian-American scene an outstanding and important figure.

A native of Russia, he came to this country in June, 1917, as the first ambassador to the United States of the Russian Provisional Government which succeeded the imperial régime in the original democratic phase of the Russian Revolution. This choice was by no means accidental, and he was well prepared for this mission. He combined an excellent command of English with a first-hand knowledge of this country, which at that time was still a rarity among the public men of Russia. He first came to America as a young engineer to study American methods of hydraulic construction. He returned to the United States for a longer stay during the First World War, as a representative of the War Industrial Committee, an organization of Russian businessmen formed for the purpose of cooperating with the government in the all-important task of assuring adequate supplies to the Russian army. By the time he arrived here as an ambassador, he was known in both countries as an active supporter of Russian-American rapprochement and cooperation.

Less than four months after he had taken up his duties in Washington, the government which he represented was overthrown by the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. This tragic event put him in an extremely difficult position, but he faced it with fortitude and dignity. It was due mostly to his wisdom and tact, as well as to the confidence he enjoyed on the part of American statesmen and public leaders, that the Russian Embassy he headed continued to operate, on the basis of full diplomatic status, for almost five years after the fall of the Provisional Government. During this trying period, Mr. Bakhmeteff undoubtedly made a substantial contribution to the formulation of that American policy which combined opposition to the Soviet régime with a friendly concern for Russia's national interests, one which was shared by both the Democratic and the Republican administrations.

After his retirement as the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Bakhmeteff established himself in New York City and went back to his original profession, resuming both his scholarly studies and his work as a practical engineer. Eventually he was appointed Professor of Fluid Mechanics at Columbia University. He became an American citizen and he increasingly identified himself with the life of this country, where he had a host of friends, including some of the most important leaders of American intellectual and public life.

He naturally retained, however, a deep concern for the fate of his native country and an attachment to Russian cultural tradition. He deliberately abstained from participation in Russian émigré politics, but there was scarcely an important organization or venture among the Russian émigrés in this country, of a charitable, cultural, or educational nature, which did not benefit from his wise counsel, moral encouragement, or material support. Few people, indeed, have contributed more to the adjustment of the émigrés to American life and to the appreciation on their part of the opportunities which America has offered them. In this respect, his death has created a vacancy which will be extremely difficult to fill.

Mr. Bakhmeteff was a man of many gifts and many achievements. As a scholar, he enjoyed an international reputation. As a teacher, he created a school of faithful disciples both in Russia and in the United States. His work in the field of practical engineering was outstanding. He was eminently successful both in diplomacy and in business. But above all, he was a man of rich and broad culture, and an idealist brought up in the best traditions of liberal humanism.

This journal, dedicated as it is to the task of interpreting Russia to American readers, cannot but mourn the passing away of such an outstanding figure in the field of Russian-American relations. But it also has its special reason for remembering Mr. Bakhmeteff with affection and gratitude; he was an unwavering friend of *The Russian Review*, and it has benefited greatly from his advice and assistance.

Book Reviews

MOORE, JR., BARRINGTON. *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power*. Harvard University Press, 1950. 503 pp. \$6.00.

This is an interesting, dispassionate and readable book. Its author is a sociologist, whose interest in the current political scene, and in Soviet politics in particular, became intensified in the course of wartime service in the Department of Justice and later in the OSS. He has been engaged on this study for a number of years and the result is the careful work under review.

The two central questions asked in the book, says the author, are: which of the pre-revolutionary Bolshevik ideas have been put into effect and why have the others been set aside, and secondly, "what can we learn from this historical experience about the rôle of ideas in general?" To provide the answers Moore describes first Leninist theory and practice before the Revolution, then in two additional parts which constitute the bulk of the book he considers what he calls the dilemma of authority from Lenin to Stalin and "today's dilemma." In the main, the crux of these dilemmas, as Moore sees them, was how to square the erstwhile doctrinal precepts of social and political equalitarianism with the needs for differential status and for restricting and concentrating decision-making in an elite, which appear to be inherent in any industrial society and are felt particularly in the type of social order which the Bolsheviks sought to erect. The author examines the relative rôle of the communist leaders and rank and file in

policy formulation and execution, the question of class structure in the USSR, the position of labor and management in industry, the transformation of the peasantry, and the pattern of Soviet foreign policy.

His conclusions can be summarized as follows. Under the impact of responsibility on their assumption of power, as well as what seem to be the inevitable requirements of an industrial order, the Bolshevik leaders were compelled to abandon altogether or to postpone indefinitely portions of their ideology, such as the idea of equality in status and material rewards and the doctrine of the withering away of the state. The transfer of the means of production to society as a whole, he states in the last paragraph of the book, "is the only aspect of Marxist-Leninist doctrine about which one can say with considerable plausibility that the goal has been achieved." This, in the opinion of the author, connotes no habitual ideological cynicism. Despite the gaps between practice and theory (particularly original ideological postulates), there is, he says, enough internal consistency and continuity in Stalin's objectives and major policies, if not in his techniques, "to reject the conclusion that he had no political principles." The program of industrialization and their desire to stay in power, dictated to the Soviet leaders ideological alterations. The stable aspect of Marxist-Leninist theory is the general method of asking questions about the environment. It is the continuity in this method, despite the flexibility and variety in the answers produced by

Lenin and Stalin to meet new situations, that has given Soviet theory "the superficially paradoxical appearance of dogmatic permanence and opportunistic change."

Among his other findings are the conclusions that power is highly centralized in the Party, with the Party summit virtually monopolizing policy formulation; that, the Party Statutes notwithstanding, there is a widespread tendency for appointment by cooption rather than election of leaders for the higher Party echelons, such as the Central Committee; that of the central representative bodies, neither the Party Congress nor the Supreme Soviet plays a creative rôle in the formulation of policy; and that Party control over the Soviets limits their potential rôle as expressions of the popular will. Generally, the Soviets and other devices for the sharing of power by the masses, though still emphasized in public pronouncements as part of the ideology of ends, have yielded to practices of strict authoritarian discipline and hierarchical subordination envisaged by the ideology of means. Criticism is deflected "from policy itself to policy execution," that is from the top leaders to the bureaucrats at the lower levels. Elections either serve the same purpose or act as a ritual of loyalty pledging to the leadership. And the net result which has emerged "is a curious amalgam of police terror and primitive 'grass-roots' democracy" (p. 403).

As for the rôle of Stalin, the author takes up such yardsticks as Stalin's elimination of his opponents in the thirties, Molotov's telephone consultations with him during negotiations, and testimony of American diplomats, and concludes that Stalin has the authority to make significant

decisions on his own, which it would be dangerous continuously to oppose even in the sessions of the Politbureau.

In an extremely cautious evaluation of the social structure, in which he points out wide variations in income, authority, and prestige, and expresses the belief that high officials transmit to their children a superior education, nutrition, clothing, "and above all acquaintance in the circles that hold power," he nevertheless refuses to draw the conclusion that a class system exists at present in the USSR. As regards labor and management, he finds that the state controls both, granting each "that share of rewards which seems empirically necessary to make the economic system function." His overall conclusion is that whatever the degree of happiness of the citizenry or the restrictions on the labor force in Soviet society, "its existence and survival in war reveals that it is a viable social system."

Lastly, concerning the foreign policy of the Soviet leaders, Moore contends that if there is any central goal behind it, it is the preservation and extension of their own power rather than realization of a doctrinal blueprint. He concludes that while prospects for a basic improvement in American-Russian relations are dim, they are not hopeless, and tension could be reduced through skilled diplomacy.

One of the few criticisms levelled at this book is that it covers a lot of ground adequately covered elsewhere. There is little doubt that the author has borrowed extensively from earlier works and at least in those cases where conclusions do not differ such excursions into familiar territory seem a waste of

time and talent. To the distinct credit of the author, however, it must be said that besides considerable little known detail he has introduced many refreshingly new approaches and interpretations, so that one lays down the book with a sense of increased understanding of the Soviet polity.

There are a few points of emphasis to which this reviewer would take exception. Query whether one can rightly speak of Bolshevik "admiration" for the masses (p. 63). The author has an exaggerated notion of Bolshevik expectations of early attainment of equalitarianism. In this and in his references to Soviet promotion of "Russian national interests" (pp. 195, 376, etc.) there seem to be faint echoes of the misleading thesis of a "great retreat." The view that by virtue of existence in the community of states, the USSR has subordinated the policy of World Revolution to the traditional policy of the balance of power carries fallacious implications, since it is a basic assumption of the Soviet leaders that the prime prerequisite for ultimate Communist victory everywhere is the building of the USSR into an impregnable fortress and the maximum strengthening of its international position. Thus, it is more correct to say that the USSR has used the balance of power in the overall interest of Communism. The author speaks of the reappearance of "old-fashioned Russian territorial interests" and asserts that Marxism has not led the USSR to enter any alliance which it would not have joined "on grounds of simple national self-interest" (pp. 391, 398). It is clear, however, that a national Russia would not have stayed out so long of the League of Nations, or

that if Russian national interests per se constituted a supreme value for the Soviet leaders, they would have been willing to stop at ethnographic frontiers after the recent war and to compromise on such traditional Russian interests as an ice-free port, access to raw materials and trade, and participation on a footing of equality in the comity of nations. That, however, was not the case.

These minor aberrations do not detract in the least from the general excellence of the volume, which, in this reviewer's opinion, is one of the finest of the recent books on the Soviet Union.

JULIAN TOWSTER

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BERMAN, HAROLD L. *Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950. 322 pp. \$4.75.

Harold Berman, of Harvard University, has submitted Soviet law to an analysis resulting in understanding it, first, as the law of a society having chosen to embody the Socialist-Communist ideal; second, as a legal system which, contrary to the individualistic law of the United States, is "parental" or "educational"; and third, a law unfolding the Russian legal tradition. A law, he says, which would be both Socialistic and parental, but not based on that tradition, would have developed quite at variance with Soviet law.

There is no doubt that the content of Soviet law is to a large extent determined by the fact that Soviet society is a Socialist (or

Communist) one, meaning that its economic system is based on the wholesale collectivization of the means of production, or, as Mr. Berman puts it, on planning. He could, however, hardly defend his definition before a forum of Soviet scientists, because, to accept it, they would have to assert that under Lenin's War Communism, there was no Socialism. He could hardly win his case before a forum of non-Soviet scientists because planning is being more and more considered and even used, outside of Socialist societies (the Monnet plan, for instance).

It is dubious whether anything significant is said when one asserts that Soviet law is parental or educational. As conceded by Mr. Berman, throughout the world the trend is now leading away from *laissez faire*, and whenever there is government interference with economic or cultural affairs, one can easily interpret the law as paternal in the very vague meaning ascribed to this term by the author. By the way, he seems to ignore the facts that, prior to the ascent of liberalism, Europe was dominated by mercantilism which definitely was parental or educational, and that, on the eve of the First World War, there was a good deal of paternalism in the law of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and other countries. This makes many parts of Mr. Berman's effort rather meaningless; many traits of Soviet law could be easily classified as paternal in content and Russian as to origin. He prefers the first of these two classifications and therefore minimizes the Russian element of Soviet law.

The study of the latter is the weakest part of Mr. Berman's work. His purpose could have

been achieved only on the basis of a painstaking comparison of Soviet law with pre-revolutionary Russian law at different periods of the latter's development. In this pre-revolutionary Russian law, two elements should have been distinguished, the purely Russian one and that based on imitation of Western law started under Peter the Great. Such an analysis would have historically located the individual times of Soviet law, so far as they are a part of the Russian tradition. For instance, in the Soviet criminal code, one would have perceived a number of imitations of the Imperial Code of 1903, itself based on a comparative study of the European codes and drafts of the late nineteenth century, but in some cases also imitations of the earlier Code of 1845, based on imitation of the Code of the Grand Duchy of Baden. In criminal procedure, one would have found numerous imitations of the criminal procedure of the Empire, itself based on French and British models; but, relating to prosecution, the model reproduced is the law of Russia prior to the Judicial Reform of Emperor Alexander II, while in the structure of Soviet courts one could not but find the influence of rather reactionary German ideas of the late nineteenth century.

In civil law, the Soviet definition of property, applauded by Mr. Berman, could be traced back to the Incorporated Laws of 1832 and through it to the Code Napoléon, while other parts would have appeared to reproduce the practice of Russian lawyers of the early twentieth century. In present day family law one could see the revival of Byzantine (Roman) law as received by Russia at the dawn of her history.

After such a dissection, a most interesting problem would have emerged: why did Soviet law choose as models sometimes specifically Russian enactments of earlier or later days, and in other cases parts of pre-revolutionary law inspired by Western law, recent or belonging to the remote past?

Nothing of this kind appears, however, in Mr. Berman's book, and this for a very simple reason: he is well versed in Soviet law, but he is not familiar either with the law of pre-revolutionary Russia and its history or with the law of continental Europe. Obvious imitations of pre-revolutionary law and of Western models are acclaimed by Mr. Berman as Soviet innovations or Soviet solutions of difficult problems challenging the American law, which, to Mr. Berman, seems to be very backward. The history of Russian law is reconstructed by him in a fantastic way probably derived from ill understood ideas of L. Petrazhitsky. There was, he thinks, official law, until quite lately, barbaric, undeveloped, and unscientific; and there was something of the kind of Petrazhitsky's unofficial or intuitive law, which in Mr. Berman's book appears under the label of "redeeming forces." One was the famous *sobornost*, another the principle of universal service, of Mongol origin; the third Russian messianism, and the fourth Peter's *furor technicus*. . . . How the second and the fourth of these forces could work outside the framework of the state, remains the author's secret. But the combination of these four forces seems, in Mr. Berman's opinion, to explain the success of Marxism in Russia: Soviet law emphasizes the totality *vs.* the individual (*sobornost*); it is deemed to

have universal validity (messianism); and it is based on universal service and on emphasis on the material equipment of the country.

Many "discoveries" made by Mr. Berman are of doubtful value. He maintains, for instance, that only under the Soviets did the Russian courts learn the significance of precedents and the art of unifying logically legal propositions which, at face value, are inconsistent. One wonders whether he ever saw the collection of the decisions of the Senate, Russia's Supreme Court, or has used any literature on the subject which appeared in Russia prior to 1917. Naturally, he was not obliged to do so. But, not having done it, he should have refrained from making statements like the one cited above.

Though containing a number of correct and sometimes interesting statements about individual items of Soviet law, the book as a whole is misleading. The basic fact about Soviet law is that it is the law of a totalitarian despotism which has partly revived those elements of the previous legal system which could be, rather superficially, incorporated into the new one. Of this basic fact Mr. Berman's readers will find no indication.

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SEEGER, ELIZABETH. *The Pageant of Russian History*. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1950. 433 pp. \$4.50.

Presenting Russian history as a "pageant" is not difficult. Especially is this true when a book is, as the author states of this work, in-

tended "for young people, and for those adults who do not want to labor through a long and scholarly work." The vivid and colorful material of the Russian medieval chronicles and *byliny* seem to demand "pageant" treatment, and this is what the author has meted out in the first six chapters of her volume. It is not easy to resist the temptation to be carried away by quaint detail. In the major portion of this text, however, Miss Seeger has managed to avoid this pitfall.

The chief virtues of her presentation do not lie in the field of interpretation. Insofar as her basic historical assumptions are made explicit, they are contained in the assertion that "nations are organisms . . . they have their particular skills and arts." We are told that Russians have an "inborn gift for organizing themselves," and hear of the "tendency to organization and democracy so natural to the Russians." When Miss Seeger declares that the First Five Year Plan was carried out by the Communists "in a truly Russian way—a violent and ruthless way," it appears that violence is a native Russian trait, along with democracy, apparently. Fortunately, statements of this kind are chiefly *obiter dicta* and do not intrude themselves unduly into her narrative.

In her narrative, the writer has done an excellent job. The whole book is a smoothly written, well-integrated story. Using mainly secondary works, she has handled these so faithfully and capably that actual errors are few, though she sometimes sides with minority opinions among contemporary scholars. She has devoted much space to Russia's early history, so that fully one half of the book deals with the

pre-Petrine period. Thus we have four pages on Andrei Bogoliubsky and four pages on Prince Mikhail of Tver, while later on, Radishchev and the Petrashevtsy, though they are discussed, are not referred to by name, and Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, Miliukov, Stolypin, and Witte are not referred to or discussed at all.

Miss Seeger's sympathetic treatment of the October Revolution and her forceful account of Communist doctrine follow curiously behind the dynastic history of the earlier chapters. The Revolution is made to appear to a great degree the work of Lenin, though one cannot accuse the author of having originated this misconception. When she says that the Provisional Government "was not concerned with the needs of the people"; when she asserts of the Mensheviks that "it was these men, who talked but were unwilling to act, whom Lenin had not wanted in his party"; when she fails to discuss the threat from the Right or even mention Kornilov's name (though she devotes 22 pages to 1917), one suspects that she is convinced that Communism was the only possible solution for Russia. Her description of the Soviet Union as "two states," the "socialist" one and the "totalitarian" one, implies a dualism which she has denied by terming Lenin and Stalin "two great autocrats" who created and ruled both.

One might suggest that, in a later edition, if the author wishes to mention the Zemsky Sobor which chose Boris Godunov, she should note that it was convened to elect Mikhail Romanov and several times during his reign; that if she mentions Ivan IV's *Sudebnik* she should refer to Alexis' *Ulozhenie*; that since she uses Old Style dates till the 1918

calendar change, she should not use the dates of the dismissal of the First Duma and the convening of the Constituent Assembly in New Style. There are other corrections which could be made, but not many. For one who has evidently not specialized in this field, errors are remarkably rare.

The publishers' jacket declares that this book "should prove interesting and useful for popular reading as well as fill a need for students as a foundation for further study." The work is admirably designed to meet these objectives.

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VARNEKE, BORIS V. *History of the Russian Theatre* (Seventeenth Through Nineteenth Century). Original translation by Boris Brasol. Revised and edited by Belle Martin. New York, Macmillan Co., 1951. 459 pp. \$6.50.

The English translation of this standard history of the Russian theatre appears in the series of the Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies and represents a long-needed addition to the extremely slim body of English books on the Russian theatre. Since the translations of the American Council of Learned Societies aim primarily at giving the English-speaking reader the "contemporary Soviet habits of thought," one may question whether this particular work has been the most felicitous choice. The most contemporary Soviet evaluation of the history of Russian theatre would be better represented by more recent publications, such as P. S.

Danilov's *Ocherki po istorii russkogo dramaticheskogo teatra*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1948, which is more consistently Marxist in its historical approach, more comprehensive, better organized, and in addition contains an almost complete and carefully arranged bibliography of the field. But the editors are also guided by the principle that "Russian history is a continuum," and Varneke's volume contains many details on the bureaucratic regimentation and thought control exercised by Russian rulers over the drama and stage of the nineteenth century, which invite easy comparisons with present conditions on the Soviet stage. Furthermore, Varneke's book is still widely used as textbook in Soviet dramatic schools and may, therefore, be justly considered as the official interpretation having the *imprimatur* of the Soviet art inquisitors. Whatever the editorial reasons may be, the English reader will be grateful for this volume because it is the first of its kind published in America.

The translation is based upon the third edition of 1938, which, according to the author's preface contains "essential changes and revisions of the two previous editions of 1908 and 1913," placing "the greatest emphasis upon the origin and development of realism on the Russian stage, which constitutes the fundamental and the most productive tendency of our entire art." While these remarks seem to imply that the book adheres strictly to the sacrosanct principles of Socialist Realism, the actual changes, fortunately, do not go too deep. The Marxist interpretation is thrown as a thin and somewhat artificial frosting upon the original text. The book remains still a history of out-

standing personalities rather than of trends and social forces. In quantity of factual material the third edition is definitely an improvement over the previous two. Two collaborators (G. I. Goyan and A. I. Boguslavsky) have contributed to the organization and subject matter, particularly in the valuable chapters on the repertoire of the eighteenth century. Also, the history of the popular drama of the earlier period has been considerably enlarged using the findings of Yu. M. Sokolov and N. K. Gudzy (authors of *Russian Folklore* and *History of Early Russian Literature*, both translated under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies).

To the personal regret of the reviewer, these changes, revisions, and additions have also considerably blurred the originally much more lucid and urbane style and the personal tone of the earlier editions. Nevertheless, even the present edition is still racy and penetrating in its chronological account of Russian dramatists and actors, often charming in its anecdotal rambling from biographical irrelevancies to discriminating critical appraisals and *apperçus*. Varneke's interpretation of the early imperial theatres under Aleksey Mikhailovich, Peter the Great, Elizabeth, Catherine II, Nicholas I, and other Russian rulers who took a great personal interest in the Russian theatre is scholarly, well-documented, and enlightening. It is also surprisingly restrained, almost sympathetic, and certainly much less schematic than the more recent publications. The view that we gain of the glories and miseries of the serf theatre, of the bureaucratic management of court theatres, of the stifling censorship that pre-

vented almost all great Russian dramatists from seeing their works performed during their lifetime on legitimate stages (Griboedov and his *Woe from Wit*, Pushkin and his *Boris Godunov*, and a host of others), is that of a good liberal scholar of the nineteenth century rather than that of a dogmatic Marxist of our times.

Very fascinating and exhaustive are the chapters dealing with early enthusiasts and stars of the Russian stage. Varneke's pictures of the broadminded and cultured F. Volkov, the elegant I. Dmitrievsky, the capricious Semyonova, and in the nineteenth century, of V. A. Karatygin, P. S. Mochalov, Lensky, and the Sadovsky family with all their personal idiosyncrasies, tastes, and dramatic preferences, belong to the best parts of the volume. A single chapter is justly dedicated to M. S. Shchepkin, the father of Russian realistic acting. Stanislavsky's eulogistic aphorism: "Shchepkin established the bases of genuine dramatic art—he is our great legislator" becomes convincing in the light of the selected excerpts of Shchepkin's own writing, numerous and well-chosen passages from the critical essays by Belinsky, D. Kryukov, and Annenkov. Here the continuity of Russian histrionic traditions is illustrated at its best.

However, the main merit of the volume does not lie in these biographical and critical sketches. As interesting and important as they may be for the student of the Russian theatre, they are of limited use to those interested in the history of the Russian theatre as an institution. In this direction, *The Russian Theatre* by René Fuloep-Miller and Joseph Gregor, translated from German into English in 1930, still provides a better organized and

more synthetic analysis of the interrelation between Russian society and stage. But Varneke's book contains also detailed critical discussions of many minor (and frequently not so minor) dramatic works of Russian playwrights, which cannot be found in the most popular manuals on Russian literature in English, such as Mirsky and more recently, Slonim. The excellent presentation of Griboedov's secondary plays (chapter XIII), the concise and very felicitous discussion of Lermontov's dramatic production (chapter XV), as well as a thorough account of the vaudeville genre (chapter XII) are invaluable chapters for the English general student of Russian literature and drama. For these sections alone, the volume must be included among the main reference works on Russian literature.

While the translation of the text is smooth, some criticism must be leveled against the translation of titles and some rather crude defects in editing the volume. The already existing confusion in translating Russian titles is being continued. To quote a few most striking cases: "The Avaricious Knight" instead of "The Covetous Knight" which should have been preserved because Pushkin himself gave this English title to his "miniature tragedy," and also because both Mirsky and Slonim use it in their manuals. *The Messrs. Golovlev* by Saltykov-Shchedrin may be as legitimate as *The Golovlev Family*, but the latter is preferable because the existing translation of the novel bears this title. Most disconcerting are the discrepancies of titles for Ostrovsky's plays as compared with those which an English student would find in the current manuals.

The editorial footnotes are mostly irrelevant or completely useless, as on pp. 76, 292, 248 ("Basil = French form of Vasily"!), or the priceless tautological note on p. 374, which defines the word *peredvizhniki* in the following manner: "exponents of realistic painting who formed a unified movement in the 1870's and whose pictures were on view at periodic showings by the *Peredvizhnik* exhibitions." The footnote on p. 311 is embarrassingly illiterate: "Based, like all the characters' names in *The Inspector-General* on onomatopoeia [!]. Derzhimorda is formed from *derzhat*, to hold or grasp + *morda*, mug, thus extortionist [!]." These flaws mar unnecessarily the otherwise well-presented and attractively printed volume.

ANDREW M. HANFMAN

Kenyon College

HINGLEY, RONALD. *Chekhov, A Biographical and Critical Study*. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1950. 278 pp. 21 /.

This is the most complete biography of Chekhov to have appeared so far in English, and the only one that makes use of recent Soviet commentary. It is an honest, well-documented study that follows the author's life scrupulously year by year. It provides a valuable bibliography, a chronological table of those of Chekhov's stories that have been translated into English, and a general index, in which English titles are given with their Russian equivalents, while a special symbol designates the works that have not been translated. In the text itself, the English form is used exclusively for

all titles, even those of the newspapers and journals to which Chekhov contributed, an arrangement that seems to me to set an excellent precedent.

In an Introduction, the biographer states that he has intended his book to be a "contribution" to the "more balanced view" with which the public has begun to regard Chekhov, correcting the "Chekhov Legend," that "widespread misconception" of him as "an apathetic pessimist, obsessed to the exclusion of everything else with the futility of life." This purpose the book does, in large measure, achieve; in the measure, that is, in which it produces the picture of a man who was decidedly not "a gentle, suffering soul" and 'a wise observer with a wistful smile and an aching heart.' But what kind of figure rises in place of the legendary one? Where, among all the pertinent facts and comments, assembled and arranged so sensibly and methodically as to leave one with no doubt concerning Mr. Hingley's seriousness and diligence; where, in all this information about his activities, opinions, friendships, loves, is the living image of Chekhov? He does not emerge as he does from the pages of those who had known him, from Gorky's diary, for example, or Korney Chukovsky's *Chekhov the Man*, with his love of fun and of human beings, his gaiety and hospitality, his ability to make people laugh till they "rolled about," his moments of bitterness and gloom, his energy and industriousness. And if Chukovsky's remark in his essay on the art of translation, "The Lofty Art" (*Visokoe Iskustvo*), that the best translators are those who are temperamentally similar or, at least, sympathetic to the writers they

translate, might be applied with equal truth to biographers, then, in the present instance, one could say that the biographer displays some of his subject's qualities to such an excessive degree that he erases others equally important, and, as a result, draws an outline, not a full portrait, of his man. It is Chekhov's reserve, modesty, and sobriety by which Mr. Hingley seems to have been most impressed. But his own reserve, modesty, and sobriety keep him so closely tethered to fact as never to permit a flight of theory or fancy. Thus, to be sure, he avoids the absurdities, errors, and sentimentalities of which other writers on Chekhov have been guilty, but, by the same token, misses their insights.

This is even truer of his literary criticism. Indeed, unless the view that Chekhov is not a purveyor of dreariness might be taken as a critical comment, Mr. Hingley—either through modesty, reserve, or fear—ventures no criticism at all. When he raises an issue, such, for example, as Chekhov's style, he contents himself with noting that it is "apparently a difficult one to estimate," citing, in proof, the completely divergent opinions about it of William Gerhardt, on the one hand, who thought it musical, and of D. S. Mirsky, on the other, who said that it was "colourless" and "devoid of all raciness and nerve." This difference is interesting and well worth the detailed presentation which Mr. Hingley accords it. But what are his own views? We are left with the impression that he does not consider himself qualified to express any.

His own style is unpretentious and clear, but, on the whole, monotonous and undistinguished. The attentiveness with which he has

read everything that Chekhov wrote and nearly everything about him in English and Russian indicates genuine admiration; yet he never gives way to the slightest lyric or enthusiastic exclamation, nothing of the kind we find, for example, in Katherine Mansfield's letters. His analyses are sound, but not deep; he adds nothing to Mirsky's brilliant dissection of the structure of Chekhov's stories, and although he has a good deal to say about "mood" as an essential of the tales (which, for some reason, he insists on calling by the Russian term *nastroenie*), he does not convey a sense of it. His summaries of the stories are, for the most part, flat: literally correct, but emotionally wrong; and one need only compare his and Oliver Elton's sketches of "The Chameleon" or "Anna on the Neck" to see how much his transcripts miss the tone, if not the meaning, of the original. His somewhat elaborate discussion of Chekhov's attitude toward Nature does not imply so much as this one sentence of Chukovsky's: "For Chekhov, Nature was always an event, and when he spoke of her he, who had such a rich command of words, more often than not found one epithet for it: wonderful." He never rises to the wit of Oliver Elton's "Most of his early works have no more middle than a wasp, and they never lack the sting"; seldom does he introduce another author to explain, suggest, or illuminate a point by means of a comparison; and he risks no generalizations, nothing like Gerhardt's "... even more distinctly than his predecessors, [Chekhov] makes us feel that he is going out and drawing us 'towards something' transcendental," or J. M. Murry's "Much more immediately than in the case

of any other writer all that he wrote appears to us as a function of all that he was," or Chukovsky's "His main, fundamental, ever-present sensation was a ravenous appetite for life . . .," or Oliver Elton's suggestion that "the ruling conception" of many of his stories is "some kind of fatal error . . . a spirit in prison: in a villa, a hut, a hospital, a factory, a monastery, the edge of a forest; or, most impassable of all, upon the open steppe,"—generalizations that, whether we agree with them or not, provoke thought and stir imagination.

The virtues of Mr. Hingley's study are moderation and solidity; its defects are the excess of these virtues. He has written, in short, a book that is unassuming, unimaginative, conscientious, and very useful.

HELEN MUCHNIC

Smith College

HEPNER, BENOIT-P. *Bakounine et le Panславisme revolutionnaire*. Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1950. 320 pp. 600 fr.

This is not a biography: it does not duplicate the works of Steklov, Kaminsky, and Professor Carr's brilliant study. Mr. Hepner analyses Bakunin's political thought up to the sixties, thus leaving out, except in his conclusion, the elaboration of the anarchist doctrine proper and the final conflict with Marx.

However, the author attempts more than the name of the book suggests. The sub-title "Five essays on the history of ideas in Russia and Europe" describes his intentions more accurately; namely, to give a picture of the ideologies that jostled

each other in the second third of the past century, with Bakunin's complex personality at their crossroads.

This purpose is achieved by an exhaustive study of the philosophical origins not merely of Bakunin's creed but of later political trends. In its objects and conclusions, the present book sometimes recalls the chapters on Bakunin in *The Origins of Modern Russia*, by Jan Kucharzewski. Both writers explore the past for clues to the present, though Mr. Hepner is more objective.

Several points are of interest. In "The French Message" the author notes that Russian political quietism sprang not only from the mysticism of St. Martin and the Rosicrucians, but also from the sensualism of Diderot and consorts; materialism and spiritualism thus combined to blunt the sense of responsibility. The contrast between the French and the German messages—one situating man in the city, the other suspending him in a void and so swinging in its conclusions between the absolutism of self and that of the state—is also pointed out. The first three essays deal with environment and influences; the fourth brings us back to Bakunin himself. Nihilism is latent in the philosophy of the absolute; its children, Bakunin's

militant nihilism, other varieties of Russian nihilism, and Nazism, end by substituting action to its aim. The consequent final prevalence of destructive passion over creative is thus shown to have brought forth from the flanks of dialectic idealism a hybrid if sometimes illegitimate breed.

The last essay follows Bakunin in his tortuous progress toward anarchism. Like Kucharzewski, Mr. Hepner sees a basic similarity between the two enemies, Marx and Bakunin. The "mighty shadow of the wizard of their youth," Hegel, stretched over both. In the absolute of revolution, the values of the human person, which revolution was to set free, were ironically whisked out of existence.

There are a few superficial flaws. Some oddities of grammar betray overexposure to foreign languages. The transliteration of Russian words is capricious. There is a minor error in the note on page 64: the Decembrist Kuchelbecker was deported to Siberia, not imprisoned in the Caucasus. But these slight defects do not detract from the value of this intelligent and scholarly work.

MARTHE BLINOFF

University of Minnesota

BOOK NOTICES

DEWAR, H. *Assassins at Large. Being a Fully Documented and Hitherto Unpublished Account of the Executions Outside Russia Ordered by the GPU.* London, Wingate, 1951. 203 pp. 12/6.

Mr. Dewar is not identified either within the text of his book or by his publisher—a fact which somewhat diminishes the value of his account as evidence. The full documentation promised by the sub-title is not given. Such references as are given are either unimpressive in themselves (e.g., to the novel, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*) or are in support of generalizations (e.g., “cf. *Under Two Dictators* . . . for the details of the fate of German Communists who took refuge in the Soviet Union. . .”). In the absence of both adequate documentation and of information about the author, *Assassins at Large* can be regarded only as a journalistic rehash of various political murders.

FISCHER, LOUIS. *The Soviets in World Affairs. A History of the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World, 1917-1929.* 2 vol. (New printing.) Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1951. 960 pp. \$10.00.

All students of Soviet affairs will be grateful to the Princeton University Press for this reissue of an extremely important study which has long been out of print and virtually unobtainable. The only difference between the reissue and the original is a new introduction by Mr. Fischer which contains several additional tid-bits of information.

As Mr. Fischer says in this new

introduction, the pro-Soviet views which he held in the 1920's are reflected in his account of the foreign policy. He holds that this was “in part a justifiable reaction to the illegal interference and military intervention and the stubborn antagonism of the outside world which the Soviet régime, animated by the dream of a better life, encountered in its early years.” Without in any way questioning Mr. Fischer's good faith, it may be pointed out that this is a highly debatable assumption. But the pro-Soviet bias of his work is not of the cryptic variety and is not, therefore, likely to take any reader unawares. Moreover, it was precisely Mr. Fischer's sympathy for the régime which made his book most valuable because it gave him unique access to important personages and sources. Neither Chicherin, nor Karakhan, nor Rakovsky, nor any of the other Soviet leaders would have spoken as freely to any non-sympathizer as they did to Mr. Fischer. It was a combination of circumstances for which the student may be thankful since it resulted in a major addition to our knowledge of the USSR and its policies.

KENAFICK, K. J. (Tr. and Ed.). *Michael Bakunin: Marxism, Freedom and the State.* London, Freedom Press, 1951. 63 pp. 5/.

Mr. Kenafick, who wrote *Michael Bakunin and Karl Marx*, has made himself the champion of the great anarchist. A major clue as to Mr. Kenafick's views and purposes is given in his statement that: “If, therefore, the Socialist movement, in its more militant and revolution-

ary aspects, continues to exist throughout the world, it is possible that the political theories of Marx may give way to those of Bakunin, and that in the end he will prevail as the inspiring genius of militant and democratic socialism."

This booklet consists of translated excerpts from the writings of Bakunin grouped under the headings of: "Marxist Ideology, The State and Marxism, Internationalism and the State, Social Revolution and the State, and Political Action and the Workers." The whole is introduced by a short and sympathetic sketch of Bakunin's life.

GURIAN, WALDEMAR (Ed.). *The Soviet Union—Background, Ideology, Reality—A Symposium*. South Bend, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1951. 216 pp. \$3.50.

The eight essays of this volume are the outgrowths of a symposium held at Notre Dame early in 1950. The editor, Dr. Gurian, contributed a general, brief introduction under the title, "The Development of the Soviet Régime from Lenin to Stalin." Professor Karpovich dealt with the "Historical Background of Soviet Thought Control"; and Dr. Naum Jasny, with the "Results of the Soviet Five Year Plans." Two essays are devoted to eastern Europe: one by Professor Mosely on the exploitation of eastern European nationalism; the other, by Professor Ketersz of Notre Dame on the methods of Soviet expansion in that area. There are also two essays on religion and the church. Professor N. S. Timasheff wrote of "Religion in Russia, 1941-1950"; and Professor Dvornik, on "Church and State

in Central Europe." An article—partly autobiographical—on "Aims and Methods of Soviet Terrorism" by V. Petròv completes the table of contents.

The general standard of the volume is high. Variations in style as well as in subject matter make any more precise statements difficult. Each reader will find his own favorite among the several essays, either because of special interest in a subject or because of interest in the author. All of the essays will repay a reading and most of them merit study. It is a significant commentary upon America's indebtedness to European scholarship that seven of the eight participants in the symposium are émigrés.

KONOVALOV, SERGE (Ed.). *Oxford Slavonic Papers. Volume 1, 1950*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1951. 129 pp. \$2.50.

This modest little paper-bound volume marks the beginning of what may well be a most important addition to our Slavic materials. "The series," to quote Professor Konovalov's brief foreword, "has as its aim the publication of articles, lectures, and documents dealing directly or indirectly with the languages, literatures, and history of Russia and other Slavonic countries." Another volume is planned and "it is hoped" that there will be others subsequent to it. If the high standards of the first volume are maintained, the hope for subsequent volumes will be widely shared.

The first volume deals wholly with Russia and is divided between literary and historical materials. It contains: an appreciation of Pushkin (by) C. M. Bowra; a study of "Russian as an Art of Expression"

(by W. J. Entwistle) and of "Colloquial and Literary Russian" (by B. O. Unbegaun); articles on "Russia's Byzantine Heritage" (by D. Obolensky) and on Anglo-Russian Relations (by the editor); and an account by J. S. G. Simmons of Ludolf and his *Grammatica Russica* (1696). The preface of this grammar is reproduced as are, also, four documents relevant to Kononov's article.

PERRY, JAMES W. *Scientific Russian*. New York, Interscience Publishers, 1950. 816 pp. \$7.50.

Professor Perry's book can be used as a textbook for classes in scientific Russian as well as for individual study. The purpose of the book is to teach students a reading knowledge of scientific and technical Russian. The topics that constitute the Russian reading exercise in each lesson—topics such as "Atomic Energy," "Vitamins," "Radioactivity," etc.—have been judiciously chosen; they make timely as well as valuable reading from the scientist's point of view. The author has packed a lot of good material into his book, and has done it in a common-sense way.

SHABAD, THEODORE. *Geography of the USSR. A Regional Survey*.

New York, Columbia University Press, 1951. 584 pp. \$8.50.

Mr. Shabad has prepared an indispensable reference book for all whose business is the study of Russia. Nowhere else is there assembled between two covers such a mass of detailed, current information about Soviet geography. In this respect it surpasses the other books in this field. But, on the other hand, Shabad's work is primarily an extended, encyclopedic treatment to be consulted rather than read. For example: "Monchegorsk, founded about 1935, is a nickel and copper mining center on the west shore of Lake Imandra. Near by is the mining settlement of Malaya Sopcha." (p. 163)

Not all of Mr. Shabad's book is written in quite so pedestrian a form. That example was chosen at random from "Part II. Regional Survey" (pp. 95-497) which deals with the USSR region by region and, within regions, *oblast* by *oblast*. The effect is like that of a conscientious and very well informed guide book—not good reading, perhaps, but indispensable to the traveler.

Fifty-seven excellent maps, prepared by Mr. Shabad especially for this book, and four detailed tables (three on population and one on administrative divisions) add greatly to the usefulness of the volume.

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
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
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
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RESOLUTION CHART



100 MILLIMETERS

INSTRUCTIONS Resolution is expressed in terms of the lines per millimeter recorded by a particular film under specified conditions. Numerals in chart indicate the number of lines per millimeter in adjacent "T-shaped" groupings.

In microfilming, it is necessary to determine the reduction ratio and multiply the number of lines in the chart by this value to find the number of lines recorded by the film. As an aid in determining the reduction ratio, the line above is 100 millimeters in length. Measuring this line in the film image and dividing the length into 100 gives the reduction ratio. Example: the line is 20 mm. long in the film image, and $100/20 = 5$.

Examine "T-shaped" line groupings in the film with microscope, and note the number adjacent to finest lines recorded sharply and distinctly. Multiply this number by the reduction factor to obtain resolving power in lines per millimeter. Example: 7.9 group of lines is clearly recorded while lines in the 10.0 group are not distinctly separated. Reduction ratio is 5, and $7.9 \times 5 = 39.5$ lines per millimeter recorded satisfactorily. $10.0 \times 5 = 50$ lines per millimeter which are not recorded satisfactorily. Under the particular conditions, maximum resolution is between 39.5 and 50 lines per millimeter.

Resolution, as measured on the film, is a test of the entire photographic system, including lens, exposure, processing, and other factors. These rarely utilize maximum resolution of the film. Vibrations during exposure, lack of critical focus, and exposures yielding very dense negatives are to be avoided.

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